# Daily Report

# Latin America

FBIS-LAT-90-149
Thursday
2 August 1990

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## Latin America

*FBIS-LAT-90-149* *2 August 1990*

CONTENTS

**NOTICE TO READERS:** An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.


**INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS**

WFTU Regional General Council Meeting Ends *[Havana Radio]* ..... 1
EEC To Finance Development in Central America *[Guatemala City SIGLO VEINTIUNO 30 Jul]* ..... 1

**INTER-AMERICAN AFFAIRS**

Deputy Ministers on Armed Forces Agreements *[San Jose Radio]* ..... 2

**CARIBBEAN**

**Cuba**

Soviet Friendship Society President Received *[Havana TV]* ..... 3
Cubans in Spanish Embassy Not Political Refugees *[Madrid Radio]* ..... 3
Jose Viera on Relations With Unified Germany *[Hamburg DPA]* ..... 3
Nyerere, Rodriguez on South Commission's Work *[Havana TV]* ..... 3

**Inter-Caribbean Affairs**

Caricom Assistance to Haiti Sent Through UN *[CANA]* ..... 4
Mexican President Hosted at Dinner, Luncheon *[Mexico City TV]* ..... 4

**Dominican Republic**

Balaguer Opens 'Pact of Solidarity' Meeting *[Santo Domingo Radio]* ..... 5

**Haiti**

RDC Advocates National Cleanup Before Elections *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* ..... 5
Weekly Suspects 'Demolition' of Army Planned *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* ..... 5
Electoral Council Publishes Election Calendar *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* ..... 6
Information Minister Explains Manigat Situation *[Port-au-Prince Radio]* ..... 6

**Trinidad and Tobago**

Rebels Still Hold Hostages; Stores To Reopen *[Madrid EFE]* ..... 7
Two Wounded Rebels Released; Hostages To Follow *[CANA]* ..... 8
Jamaican Troops Reportedly Arrive With Aid *[Caracas TV]* ..... 8
Army Says Rebels To Surrender Unconditionally *[CANA]* ..... 8
President Noor Hasseneli Returns in Wake of Coup *[Madrid EFE]* ..... 8
Government Spokesman Announces End To Crisis *[CANA]* ..... 9
Police Official Describes Attack on Headquarters *[CANA]* ..... 9
More on Rebel Leader's Surrender, Freed Hostages *[CANA]* ..... 9
Hostage Release, Rebel Surrender Described *[CANA]* ..... 10
Parliamentarian Wounded During Coup Attempt Dies *[CANA]* ..... 11
Caricom Requested To Keep Troops in Place *[CANA]* ..... 11

## CENTRAL AMERICA

### El Salvador

Ponce Hopes FMLN Respects San Jose Agreements *[EL DIARIO DE HOY 31 Jul]* ..... 12
Government Officials Discuss Peace Talks *[San Salvador Radio]* ..... 12
Antel Workers Strike to Protest 'Small' Raise *[San Salvador Radio]* ..... 19

### Guatemala

URNG Communique on Possible Renewed Actions *[EL GRAFICO 28 Jul]* ..... 19
* Favorable Trade Balance Up 12 Percent *[DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA 20 Jun]* ..... 21
* Minorities Unrepresented in Congress *[PRENSA LIBRE 21 Jun]* ..... 21

### Nicaragua

Humberto Ortega Discusses Army, Government *[Managua TV]* ..... 21
Labor Notes Discontent With 12 July Agreement *[BARRICADA 31 Jul]* ..... 31
Rosales Views Labor Union Position *[Managua TV]* ..... 32
Politicians on 'Brigades of National Salvation' *[BARRICADA 28 Jul]* ..... 32
Sandinist Military School Graduates First Class *[Managua Radio]* ..... 33

## SOUTH AMERICA

### Argentina

Seineldin Labels Alleged Coup Plot 'Nonsense' *[NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS]* ..... 34
Government Seeks To Prevent Money-Laudering *[Buenos Aires Radio]* ..... 34
Military Divided Over Antidrug Role *[DYN]* ..... 34
Defense Minister Romero To Visit United States *[Buenos Aires Radio]* ..... 35

### Bolivia

Armed Forces To Join Antidrug Struggle *[La Paz Radio]* ..... 35
Government Approves Agreements With Italy, Spain *[La Paz Radio]* ..... 35

### Brazil

Embraer Official Denies Report on Aid to Iraq *[O GLOBO 1 Aug]* ..... 35
Ministers Set Date for Initiating Common Market *[Brasilia Radio]* ..... 36
Military Ministers Voice Concern Over Salaries *[Brasilia Radio]* ..... 36
Activities at Ford Plant Reportedly Normalizing *[Rio de Janeiro TV]* ..... 36

### Chile

Argentina's Kohan Comments on Integration Process *[EL MERCURIO 25 Jul]* ..... 37
Soviet Fishing Fleet Using Chemical Lures *[LA TERCERA DE LA HORA 24 Jul]* ..... 37
Drop in Fishing Production Reported *[Santiago TV]* ..... 37
Discovery of Human Remains Near Calama Reported *[EL MERCURIO 25 Jul]* ..... 37

### Colombia

Gaviria, Parties Agree on Assembly Agenda *[Bogota TV]* ..... 38
Minister Denies Truce With Extraditables *[Bogota Radio]* ..... 38
Murder Supects Claim To Be Army Informers *[Hamburg DPA]* ..... 38
* Reasons for Military Changes Outlined *[SEMANA 26 Jun]* ..... 39
* Trade Strategy With East Europe Outlined *[LA REPUBLICA 26 Jun]* ..... 40

## Peru

Senate President, Executive Board Sworn In *[EL COMERCIO 27 Jul]* ..... 41
Shining Path, MRTA Control Large Areas *[EXPRESO 26 Jul]* ..... 41

## Guyana

Prime Minister Praises Relations with Havana *[Havana TV]* ..... 42

## WFTU Regional General Council Meeting Ends

*FL2507195090 Havana Radio Reloj Network in Spanish 1932 GMT 25 Jul 90*

[Text] The agreement that the World Federation of Trade Unions' [WFTU] regional office for Latin America and the Caribbean should be in Cuba was one of the proposals that the area's union leaders will take to the 12th congress of that organization, which will be held at the end of the year in Moscow.

The meeting of the WFTU General Council for Latin America and the Caribbean, which was held in Havana, has issued a resolution of solidarity with the Cuban people and the revolution. The document states that to attack Cuba is to attack Latin America and the world that is fighting for its liberation. Therefore, the struggle will not take place only in Cuba but throughout the world. At the end of the meeting, WFTU Secretary General Ibrahim Zakaria asserted that at the congress in Moscow, the revolutionary traditions of the international workers movement will be upheld.

## EEC To Finance Development in Central America

*PA0108212190 Guatemala City SIGLO VEINTIUNO in Spanish 30 Jul 90 p 12*

[Text] Marco Antonio Villamar Contreras, secretary general of the SIECA [Secretariat of Central American Economic Integration], has reported that the EEC has guaranteed $155 million in financing for integral development projects in Central America.

High level and technical meetings have taken place over the last few weeks to carry out the order issued by the area presidents during the economic summit based on the Declaration of Antigua Guatemala and the Central American Economic Action Plan.

One of the meetings took place in Tegucigalpa, Honduras. At that meeting, a balance of the current mutual cooperation and its short and medium term perspectives within the agreements of the Central American foreign ministers was made.

SIECA Secretary General Villamar Contreras said that a number of projects will become reality thanks to the 60-percent increase in aid from the ECC to Central America. The increase is due to steps taken by the European Commission, which gave the Central American region a high priority.

## Deputy Ministers on Armed Forces Agreements

*PA0108182590 San Jose Radio Reloj in Spanish 1237 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] The armed forces must defend sovereignty. The armed forces of the countries of the area must defend the sovereignty, territory, and internal order of their country and not be of a defensive nature, the Commission on Security and Verification of the Limitation of Arms has resolved.

During a meeting in San Jose, the deputy foreign ministers and military commanders of the countries of the area resolved that the armed forces should maintain a reasonable balance and a proportional and overall equilibrium of arms, equipment, and troops, which will not constitute a threat to the neighboring countries.

The need to define a new model in relations of security among the Central American countries and to bolster communications and cooperation was decided upon by the deputy foreign ministers. The deputy foreign ministers also determined that it is necessary to secure agreements on the foreign military presence in the region, for which a series of objectives have been established in terms of the general agreement. It was established that military necessities must respond to the realities of each country, considering its territorial location, extension, geographical characteristics, and borders.

The establishment of the limits and [word indistinct] of the armies of the Central American region will be carried out by making inventories of the weapons and troops. Nonetheless, when it is necessary to confront internal conflicts or subversive movements in the area, the limits agreed to can be exceeded in terms of the size of the troops and specific equipment for such subversion. These increases will be subject to the mechanisms of verification and control established by the commission.

The Commission on Security and Verification of Arms Limitation, which accepted the UN and OAS proposals of cooperation, will meet in each country in alphabetical order. The next meeting was scheduled for 10 and 11 September in San Salvador. The agenda for the meeting will include the definition of the terms for the inventory to be made, the control and verification mechanisms, and the definition of the advisory assistance to be offered by the UN and OAS.

## Cuba

### Soviet Friendship Society President Received

*FL0108194590 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 1700 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Boris Andreyev, president of the Association of Friendship with Cuba in Leningrad, is visiting the country. He was invited to attend the 26 July victory celebrations. Andreyev was received by Professor Zoilo Marinello, president of the Cuban-Soviet Friendship Association.

The two leaders briefly exchanged opinions on the visit that Andreyev is making to the country at the invitation of the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples [ICAP] to attend the 26 July celebrations. Andreyev, who is also director of the CPSU School of Higher Education in Leningrad, talked to us for a few minutes.

[Begin Andreyev recording, in Russian with passage by passage translation into Spanish] A few minutes ago, as you have seen, we had a meeting with Professor Zoilo Marinello. We told him that the stage when we could say "Viva our friendship, hurrah," was over. It is alright to say "Viva our friendship," but now we have to be more concrete, we need more direct relations between our peoples and our organizations to solve concrete problems. That will be our contribution. In this very difficult period for all the peoples of the world, for our peoples, it is not a secret that there are many who try to find cracks in the relations between us— in the friendship between ourselves, our peoples, our parties, and our friendship societies. Our work is precisely to prevent that from happening and to make our words when we say, "Viva the Cuban-Soviet friendship," mean something organized and concrete. Thank you very much. [end recording]

### Cubans in Spanish Embassy Not Political Refugees

*LD0108223390 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2100 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Excerpt] We now have an urgent link up with Havana because our correspondent there, Jose Antonio Martin Meden, has been able to obtain important information on the crisis between Spain and Cuba on the people who have entered our embassy in that country. According to this latest information, none of the 18 Cubans who are in our embassy are political refugees, and this could influence the situation:

[Martin] None of the 18 Cubans in the Spanish Embassy here in Havana are political refugees. According to the [word indistinct] confidential report of someone very well informed due to his links with the embassy, none of the 18 Cubans seeking temporary refuge in our embassy suffer from what is usually understood as political persecution from Fidel Castro's regime. According to the same source, the problem that has arisen in the Spanish Embassy in Cuba could have happened in many of the Latin American countries where from very early in the morning there are long lines of people at the Spanish consulates to obtain visas for travel to Spain in the search of a better economic future.

There seems to be an increasing feeling that an outcome to the crisis will not be soon. Negotiations are taking place at a high level, and Ignacio Ruperez, charge d'affaires here in Havana, says that the refugees in our embassy have not changed their minds. [passage omitted]

### Jose Viera on Relations With Unified Germany

*LD0108225290 Hamburg DPA in German 2220 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Excerpts] Havana (DPA)—According to Vice Foreign Minister Jose Raul Viera, Cuba is interested in maintaining "intensive relations" with the future all-German government. Viera today told DPA in Havana that the Cuban Government under Fidel Castro respected "the Germans' decision" to reunify.

"I hope it will be possible to develop comprehensive relations," Viera said. However, at the moment there was "great uncertainty about the future of comprehensive economic relations with the GDR." The GDR had "no longer fulfilled part of its commitments," the vice foreign minister said. Nonetheless, this apparently was not a political decision, but the consequence of "production problems at various GDR enterprises."

On the latest events concerning embassy refugees in Havana, Viera said that this did "not necessarily" have to have negative effects on relations between Havana and Bonn. Cuban dissidents had stated on state television after several embassy occupations that diplomats from Bonn and Washington had been hatching relevant plans for months. A Czechoslovak diplomat had even actively promoted the first embassy occupation. The governments in Bonn, Washington, and Prague have strongly denied this. [passage omitted]

According to the Cuban politician, European states should not join the "hostile policy of blockading" by the United States. The "nations' right to self-determination," which had been proclaimed with regard to the political changes in Eastern Europe, also had to be valid for Cuba. Cuba demanded the right "to shape its own internal affairs," even if Havana trod an independent path and stuck to socialism. [passage omitted]

### Nyerere, Rodriguez on South Commission's Work

*FL0208011890 Havana Television Service in Spanish 0000 GMT 2 Aug 90*

[Text] The members of the South Commission left today for Venezuela after ending their work in our capital.

Before the 28 Third World figures left for Caracas to attend the ninth meeting, Commission Chairman Julius Nyerere assessed the meeting with Cuban leader Fidel Castro.

[Begin Nyerere recording, in English with simultaneous Spanish translation] I believe that my colleagues will agree with me that yesterday's meeting, apart from the fact that it has been the longest we have had with a chief of state, was absolutely unique due to the weight of the matters we discussed and the interest and commitment of Comrade Fidel on the questions of development of the Third World.

The discussion was a very good discussion. Many of the commissioners participated. They asked Comrade Fidel a lot of questions and, as usual, Comrade Fidel answered them with great clarity and tremendous commitment. At the end of that meeting I was absolutely thrilled about it. We could have gone on longer for another two or three more hours. It was a tremendous meeting, a very good meeting. I am very pleased with the result. I am very glad to be here and especially please with that last meeting. [end recording]

During the eighth meeting in Havana, the commission gave the final touches to their three-year work investigating the Third World's situation and making suggestions for development.

Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, vice president of the Councils of State and Ministers of Cuba, expressed his views on the work of the South Commission regarding Latin America.

[Begin Rodriguez recording] We have been able to convey Latin America's experience. Despite the historic development conditions it had, it has suffered the same setback the rest of the developed and underdeveloped world has had in these last few years and has felt the brutal pressures the United States has exerted over Latin America during this period of time. The consequences of the differences between the North and the South are more visible in Latin America because Latin America had advanced more as a whole. So, we have been able to convey this kind of experience. We believe that the contribution made by Latin America has been essential. Although it has been a collective work, Latin America has contributed its share. [end recording]

## Inter-Caribbean Affairs

### Caricom Assistance to Haiti Sent Through UN

*FL0108213290 Bridgetown CANA in English 1938 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Aug 1, CANA—Caribbean Community (Caricom) governments have agreed that whatever assistance they will provide to Haiti, for holding free and fair elections in November will have to be channelled through a United Nation's coordinated programme.

Conference sources told CANA that the Caricom leaders, meeting here for their 11th summit, felt that the UN was best placed to coordinate the external electoral assistance to Haiti. Haiti and other regional and international political issues were discussed by the leaders here on Wednesday morning. The sources said that any Caricom assistance will be subject "of course to the sovereign wishes of the government and people of Haiti".

The leaders have also taken into consideration, the "willingness of Venezuela to work in tandem with Caricom in providing electoral and other assistance to Haiti," the sources said.

Haitians are expected to go to the polls in November to elect a new president, and Caricom has dispatched two ministerial missions to Haiti so far, to discuss assistance with the forthcoming election of a new president.

The leaders have also agreed that the involvement of the UN, the Organisation of American States and other actors, was consistent with the ministerial missions' recommendation regarding international funding for Caricom's electoral assistance to Haiti.

The report by the ministerial missions has concluded that Haitians "would find Caricom nationals more acceptable as electoral experts or observers than they would say, Europeans, North Americans or persons from the Dominican Republic," the sources told CANA.

### Mexican President Hosted at Dinner, Luncheon

*PA0108182490 Mexico City Red Nacional 13 Imevision Television in Spanish 1300 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Italicized passages are recorded]

[Text] President Carlos Salinas de Gortari has said that Mexico has decided to diversify its relations and trade with all the regional blocs that have emerged as financial, commercial, and technological development centers. During a dinner reception offered by the Jamaican Government, the Mexican president said:

[Salinas] *We trade with everyone because we believe that our sovereignty and independence cannot be guaranteed and defended in isolation. Instead, our sovereignty and independence will be guaranteed by sovereign [as heard] access to capital, to technologies, and to scientific and industrial advances characteristic of the modern world.*

He added that in the evolution of the current world, economic links have greater influence than ideologies or traditional systems of strategic alliances.

[Salinas] *These are great challenges, because here on the dawn of the next century, a global economy has suddenly emerged. This means there are possibilities of well being for the peoples who take part in it. However, it may also condemn countries to stagnation and poverty if they do not adapt to this transformation or respond in a timely manner to its demands.*

Also, during a luncheon offered by [Deputy] Prime Minister James Patterson at the Valet Royal official residence, President Salinas de Gortari stressed that Mexico is committed to strengthening international cooperation to fight drug trafficking.

[Salinas] *Mexico will continue to take an active role in international actions against drug trafficking. We will continue to do so with our neighbors, particularly with our neighbor to the north, the United States, and with our neighbors to the south—Guatemala and Belize—two countries with whom we have intensified actions. Now with our third border, by establishing this agreement with Jamaica, we demonstrate our great conviction to fight drug trafficking in the Caribbean.*

The Mexican president said that although international changes in economic and political matters are of great significance, this same interest should be demonstrated in the fight against drug trafficking.

[Salinas] *He who believes that because drug trafficking may not directly affect and involve his own citizens and evades taking part in this international cooperation is making a serious mistake. Sooner or later this problem will inevitably affect them.*

President Salinas de Gortari said that Mexicans must fight drug trafficking within the framework of our laws, respecting citizens' rights.

Following a heavy work schedule, the Mexican president received Mr. Edward Seaga, leader of the opposition Jamaican Labor Party. President Salinas also held private meetings with the 13 heads of state of the Caribbean Community countries. Today, President Salinas de Gortari will attend the annual Caribbean Common Market [Caricom] meeting.

## Dominican Republic

### Balaguer Opens 'Pact of Solidarity' Meeting

*FL0108190590 Santo Domingo Radio-Television Dominicana Radio Network in Spanish 1600 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Report by Viviano de Leon from the National Palace]

[Excerpts] President Joaquin Balaguer has opened the meeting with different sectors of society that is being held at the National Palace to discuss the Pact of Solidarity. The president said that the government would not issue money without the appropriate backing [dinero inorganicco] and asked entrepreneurial sectors to give the program their full support. Balaguer said the Pact was the appropriate path to solve the current crisis in the country and added that the government is open to any suggestions from any sector. [passage omitted]

After President Balaguer's introduction, Hector Perez Reyes read the government proposal for a Pact of National Solidarity to the different groups that are participating in the meeting at the National Palace's Council of Government Room.

The Pact includes establishing a single exchange rate with a provision for regular reviews, undertaking an in-depth tax reform, increasing public and private employees' salaries, and renegotiating the foreign debt within the possibilities of the country. The Pact will be in effect for six months and will be supervised by a commission designated by the executive branch.

The Pact also establishes that housewives will be organized by sectors to control and stabilize the price of staples.

Tomorrow, President Joaquin Balaguer will inaugurate the second stage of Los Rios housing project and a church in that sector of the capital. The two works were built by the government at a cost of 10,175,481 pesos and 72 cents.

## Haiti

### RDC Advocates National Cleanup Before Elections

*FL0108131690 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1100 GMT 30 Jul 90*

[Excerpts] The Christian Democratic Assembly [RDC] suggests that the entire Haitian population mobilize immediately—just as the populations of Petit Goave, Leogane, Gonaives, and Saint-Marc have—with a view to a thorough uprooting, so they can create normal conditions for elections.

According to RDC, the normal conditions necessary for elections are not present. RDC says elections are the business of the Haitian people. It is not up to Jimmy Carter, the United Nations, the State Council, or even the Government and the Provisional Electoral Council to tell the Haitian people to head for the polling places for an election that will make people have to count corpses again just to put a ferocious dictator into power.

RDC says that it will accept the election only if it conforms to the will of the sovereign people, which carries more weight than the Constitution.

Patriotism and respect require that the Haitian people be assisted in effecting a thorough national cleanup to create most of the conditions necessary for holding free, honest, democratic elections. [passage omitted]

It is obvious to the RDC that the government and the Army want to hold an election to please the foreigners.

### Weekly Suspects 'Demolition' of Army Planned

*FL0108140790 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1600 GMT 30 Jul 90*

[Metropole Press Review]

[Excerpt] The matter of elections once again takes precedence over other topics, pushing the Lafontant affair and the Bahamas tragedy into the background. Most of the papers published last weekend carry long commentaries and analyses on Haiti's initiatives before the United Nations in connection with the November elections.

Although the editorialists unanimously acknowledge that elections are a necessity for Haiti, they are, on the other hand, profoundly divided over the project for military aid to guarantee the security of these elections. Some consider this to be meddling in Haiti's internal affairs and fear that it could provoke a foreign intervention.

In an analysis of an interview with Haitian Foreign Minister Kesler Clermont in LE PETIT SAMEDI SOIR, Yves Germain Joseph carries this connection even further. Joseph says: There is a plot against the national sovereignty, and against the Haitian Army in particular.

Under the pretext of helping to guarantee security for the elections, Mrs. Ertha Pascal Trouillot's government is, in fact, planning the demolition of the Haitian Armed Forces and the temporary occupation of the national territory by a predominantly American and Dominican international force. [passage omitted]

## Electoral Council Publishes Election Calendar

*FL0108174790 Port-au-Prince Radio Metropole in French 1600 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] The election calendar has been published. A first round of general elections is scheduled for 4 November, and the president-elect is to be installed on 7 February 1991.

Before this occurs, however, the Departmental Electoral Bureaus [BED's] will be formed and installed. This is scheduled for 31 July-8 August. The Communal Electoral Bureaus [BEC's] will be set in place and the representatives of the communal sections chosen 6-10 August. The personnel for the voter registration offices will be chosen, trained, and sworn in 10-19 August. Voter registration is to take place 19 August-9 September. Declarations and deposits of candidacy will be received 21 August-4 September. Contestations of candidacies will be received 21 August-7 September.

September 19 will mark the opening of the electoral campaign, and the end of the period for delivering the certificates of deposit. The electoral campaign will end at midnight on 2 November.

The first round of the general elections will take place on 4 November.

Should a runoff be necessary, the second electoral campaign will open on 14 November. Contestations of the results of the first round of elections will be received 14-16 November, and a decision on these contestations will be reached between 14-20 November.

The results of the runoff elections will be made public seven days after the runoffs.

The municipal councils, municipal assemblies, and departmental assemblies will be installed 13 December 1990-13 January 1991; the legislative chambers on 14 January 1991; and the president-elect on 7 February 1991—according to the electoral calendar published today by the Provisional Electoral Council [CEP].

## Information Minister Explains Manigat Situation

*FL0108184590 Port-au-Prince Radio Soleil Network in Creole 1100 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Excerpts] There is great disappointment among the members of the Assembly of Progressive National Democrats [RDNP] and a number of other partisans and friends of RDNP leader Leslie Manigat, who the Haitian Government yesterday decided not to allow into Haiti. Mrs. Ertha Pascal Trouillot's provisional government decided to prevent former President Manigat from entering Haiti. Meanwhile, there were apparently thousands of Manigat partisans preparing to receive him warmly.

The government forbade all airlines to carry Manigat aboard their planes. Had they brought him to Haiti, they would have had to keep him on the plane until they could take him back. [passage omitted]

According to Information Minister Carlo Desinor, former President Manigat refused to sign a written statement, or make a public statement, indicating that he was returning to Haiti as a mere citizen and not as president of Haiti. Because Manigat refused to make the statement, and the government does not want to allow the situation in Haiti to worsen, it was obliged to block the professor. That was the government's only reason for not allowing him into the country, said Haitian Information Minister Desinor.

[Begin Desinor recording] Through diplomatic channels, the government informed him that the situation had to be clarified. The provisional government is prepared to welcome the private citizen; even the political figure who, within the framework of the electoral process, is going to resume his political activities, right? Given the current context, however, there was no way we could receive any discordant element, with conflicting titles and especially with discordant pretensions.

The provisional government asked him to make a public statement and even a written statement so that everyone would know in what capacity he would be returning to Haiti. Up until 2300 last night, he had refused to make such a statement, claiming that people should simply take his word for it.

So, as you can well imagine, in this current situation in which there are so many dossiers to manage, the government, by virtue of the responsibility it has, cannot allow anything to add to the existing confusion. Do you know what I mean?

That is why the Ministry of Interior issued the memorandum to the airlines to not take Manigat aboard as long as he had not made the public statement; as long as we do not know in what capacity he is returning. The moment he formally, publicly declares that he will be returning as a simple citizen, even though as a political figure or even a presidential candidate, the provisional government has no objection to his return.

However, this business of coming with the title of president, as I said a moment ago, a title that can lead to conflict, to add to this confusion, well, I think the government's responsibility obliges it to take this measure. [end recording]

All the posters and pictures of the former president pasted up in expectation of Manigat's arrival appeared in Haiti after this decision was reached.

Also, we must say there was great shock among RDNP partisans. They further verbalized their opinions to make the government see they were unhappy. They even began a demonstration, which the previously mobilized police dispersed. We must also point out that another, anti-Manigat demonstration was staged yesterday. [passage omitted]

In an interview with Radio Metropole yesterday afternoon, Manigat said he was very indignant about this government decision. [passage omitted]

[Manigat said] this was an arbitrary act, because the government contented itself with saying it was for reasons of State. Thus, there is still a dictatorship in Haiti, despite 7 February 1986 and despite the government's statement that it has come to create a democracy. Lafontant entered Haiti and is still in the country, yet he, Manigat, cannot enter Haiti. This is a total disappointment.

Manigat said he was clear about things, that he was returning to Haiti as a citizen and as the leader of a political party, a messenger of peace who was not going to seek conflict with anyone at all. [He said] his presence in Haiti would have given people greater confidence in the electoral process. The way things have started here, however, he does not think many people are going to believe anything serious is being accomplished.

Manigat abstained from pointing the finger at the embassies as also being responsible for the decision not to allow him to return. He said he had no proof. Lastly, the RDNP leader declared that he has just begun to battle dictatorship in Haiti, despite this big disappointment.

## Trinidad and Tobago

### Rebels Still Hold Hostages; Stores To Reopen

*PA0108142290 Madrid EFE in Spanish 0652 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Report by Edward Cash]

[Text] Port of Spain, 1 Aug (EFE)—Trinidad and Tobago Government Spokesman Gregory Shew last night said that the Muslim extremist group that released Prime Minister Arthur Robinson is still holding 22 hostages.

Shew announced that Finance Minister Selby Wilson, Health Minister Emanuel Hosein, Youth and Culture Minister Jennifer Johnson, Social Development and Family Minister Gloria Henry, Justice and National Security Minister Selwyn Richardson, Foreign Affairs Secretary of State Eden Shand, and Joseph Thuney from the office of the prime minister are still being held hostage.

The government spokesman added that the rebel soldiers are also holding Parliament Vice President Anthony Saint George; Renaud Fernandez, former British high commissioner for Trinidad and Tobago; and four opposition members.

Shew asserted that the negotiations between the government and the rebels continued last night in the hope that some of the hostages held both at the Parliament and at facilities of Trinidad and Tobago Television would be released today.

The Muslim group Jamaat Al Muslimeen led by former policemen Yasin Abu Bakr is still controlling both of the aforementioned facilities.

There has been widespread looting and the number of dead could be over 100, although the government has not yet reported the total number of people killed. The police have repeatedly indicated that they will not release the total number of dead until the bodies are duly identified. They hope to complete the identification process within the next 48 hours.

In addition, John Andrews, secretary of the Finance Ministry, last night announced that the Chamber of Commerce members decided that all of the country's stores should reopen as of Thursday, 2 August. Andrews made the announcement at the end of a ministers' meeting held last night in a government building, which he did not identify for security reasons.

John Andrews added that the presidents of the country's banks, insurance company managers, and shopping mall and other store owners and managers participated in the meeting. We have met with bank presidents, insurance companies and commercial center representatives to get them to start working at 1000 GMT on 2 August, said Andrews over the government radio station. Their only request was that the Armed Forces give them protection

to reopen their firms, and the government agreed to do this, he added. Thus, on 2 August we will take the first steps to get Trinidad and Tobago back to normal after the events that caused the loss of several lifes, stated the Finance Ministry secretary.

Andrews also reported that he will meet with national petroleum company officials today to request that on 2 August they also start to supply fuel to Port of Spain gas stations as well as to other sectors of this Caribbean island.

The finance minister official added: We hope all commercial centers in Port of Spain's outskirts will open their doors because the stores in the city have been totally destroyed by looters or burned out during the clashes between the Muslim extremists and the Army. He added that the merchants' and bankers' decision to reopen their firms could mean that the 24-hour curfew would be reduced to only 12 hours.

### Two Wounded Rebels Released; Hostages To Follow

*FL0108163090 Bridgetown CANA in English 1621 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Aug 1, CANA—Two armed members of the Jamaat al Muslimeen group were released around 10 AM (1400 GMT) on Wednesday at the start of what Army sources said was the phased release of hostages and their captors.

The development signals the approaching end of a four-day crisis which started on Friday night when Jamaat members stormed Parliament in a coup attempt, seizing legislators. Staffers at the state television station were also held.

Four Jamaat members left the Red House (Parliament building) at 10 AM. One, who was injured in the arm, walked out freely. A second, injured by gunshots to his leg and hip, was carried on a stretcher by two men. The two stretcher bearers returned to the Red House after depositing the stretcher in the back of a waiting ambulance which then sped away along Abercromby Street.

Army officials said the walking man had been injured in the arm. They said the man on the stretcher had been hit by bullets in the leg and hip.

Senior Army officers then left for the offices of Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) where they were to supervise the release of 36 journalists and media workers held by Jamaat leader, Yasin Abu Bakr, since last Friday. When that stage of the operation was complete, officers said that they would return to supervise the release of 14 parliamentarians being held in the Red House.

Army officers said government ministers Jennifer Johnson [words indistinct] and Gloria Henry (Family Services) were expected to be in the next batch of releases from the Red House.

Army officers, who were out in the field organising transportation and medical checks for the captors and hostages, were unavailable to explain whether the arrangement was an unconditional surrender or there were conditions attached.

Government officials told CANA [CARIBBEAN NEWS AGENCY] Muslimeen who were the first to be released, were taken for medical treatment under arrest.

Earlier this week, the Muslimeen had insisted on an insurrection amnesty granting them immunity from prosecution. They had forced Prime Minister A.N.R. Robinson during his captivity to agree to a document to this effect.

### Jamaican Troops Reportedly Arrive With Aid

*PA0108164590 Caracas Venezolana de Television Canal 8 in Spanish 1618 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] According to the latest reports from international news agencies, Jamaican troops have been disembarking in Port of Spain since yesterday, bringing in aid for that country, specifically food, and also helping to restore order.

### Army Says Rebels To Surrender Unconditionally

*FL0108165690 Bridgetown CANA in English 1648 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Aug 1, CANA—Black Muslim rebels who staged a bloody coup attempt here on Friday night, have agreed to an unconditional surrender, Army sources said.

The announcement came as the Army reported the start of a phased release of hostages and their captors at two locations—the Red House where armed Muslimeen were holding a group of parliamentarians and the state television station where rebel leader Yasin Abu Bakr was holding journalists and other staff.

Earlier, the Muslimeen were insisting on immunity from prosecution. Spokesmen had reported such an agreement with the government. It was not immediately clear what brought about the change in the rebels' position, but the Army and police were reported against any amnesty.

### President Noor Hasseneli Returns in Wake of Coup

*PA0108173490 Madrid EFE in Spanish 1653 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Excerpt] Port of Spain, 1 Aug (EFE)—Trinidadian and Tobagan President Noor Hassanali returned from his vacation last night to find the country under a state of siege after the attempted coup d'etat carried out by the Muslim group Jamaat Al Muslimeen on Friday, 27 July.

In the first communique released to the public by the government radio station today, an unidentified government spokesman reported that Hassanali will meet with the Parliament members today.

Hassanali was spending his vacation in England and, until his return to the country, was being replaced by Vice President Emanuel Carter.

The government spokesman added that Police Commissioner Jules Bernard, who will attend the meeting between Hassanali and the Parliament members, also arrived in the country last night. At this time, there have been no reports on Prime Minister Arthur Robinson's health. Robinson remained in the hands of the Muslim extremists for five days and was released on Tuesday, 31 July. He was thenrushed to a private hospital.

During his captivity, Robinson was shot at and hit in the face. Trinidadian and Tobagan Attorney General Anthony Smart reported that Robinson's glaucoma worsened during his captivity because of the lack of medication. [passage ommitted]

### Government Spokesman Announces End To Crisis

*FL0108181490 Bridgetown CANA in English 1801 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Aug 1, CANA—The Trinidad and Tobago Government Wednesday afternoon announced an end to a five-day-old political crisis, with the release of hostages held by Black Muslim rebels who staged a bloody coup attempt last Friday night.

Government spokesman Gregory Shaw told reporters that parliamentarians detained at the Red House were being freed as well as reporters and staff of the state television station, which was turned into the headquarters of rebel leader Yasin Abu Bakr. Shaw denied that the rebels would be allowed to go free.

Officials, confirming what Army sources had said earlier, told CANA afterwards that Shaw's denial meant the Jamaat al Muslimeen members had surrendered unconditionally and would be put under arrest following the release of the hostages. The rebels face possible treason charges which carry the death sentence on conviction here.

### Police Official Describes Attack on Headquarters

*FL0108193090 Bridgetown CANA in English 1832 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Aug 1, CANA—All of Trinidad's criminal records and fingerprint files, along with most other police documents, were destroyed in a car bomb blast and fire during Friday's attempted coup, officials said. But just one officer died in the attack on police headquarters. The others escaped by crashing a truck through a locked gate after starting it by jump-wiring—a trick normally used by criminals.

In the first detailed description of Friday's attempted coup by a Black Moslem group, a senior police official said many officers could have died in the assault. The attack on police headquarters came on Friday evening shortly after rebel gunmen burst into the Parliament building across tree-lined Woodford Square.

In the middle of the chaos, a black car carrying four heavily armed members of the rebel Jamaat al Muslimeen pulled up to the entrance of police headquarters. Three gunmen jumped out and sprayed the entrance with bullets, killing a police sentry. A fourth Black Moslem then drove the car through the front doors. The driver bolted seconds before the car erupted into a ball of flames.

Heavy fire broke out between rebels and police, said the police official, a section commander with more than 30 years in the Trinidad Police Force. He declined to be named.

"There were bullets flying in all directions and the fire was getting worse fast," he said. "We couldn't go out the front, so we all headed for the back door."

But that exit was blocked by a 12-foot (four-meter) metal fence normally open only for delivery vehicles. Three officers scaled the fence, but were injured jumping down on the other side. One suffered a fractured skull, the officer said. A heavy padlock sealed the gate and no one could find the key. With flames getting more intense and gunfire increasing, someone produced a bolt-cutter. That didn't work.

The officers next blasted away at the lock with a semi-automatic rifle. It still would not give and the fire was moving nearer.

"When we couldn't shoot the lock off, someone decided to drive this big police truck," the officer said. "But we couldn't find that key either. So one of our guys jump-wired it." The truck started and the officers leaped on.

"We rammed it through the gate and finally got out."

The officer, one of the last to leave the building and headquarters compound, said he was confident all escaped.

In less than five minutes the headquarters was filled top to bottom with flames. With gunfire crackling through Woodford Square, firefighters had to let the building burn.

"It was unbelievable, because it all happened so fast," the officer said.

### More on Rebel Leader's Surrender, Freed Hostages

*FL0108220190 Bridgetown CANA in English 2151 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Port of Spain, Trinidad, Aug 1, CANA—Rebel leader Yasin Abu Bakr surrendered to Trinidad and Tobago authorities on Wednesday, ending a paralysing national crisis that began on Friday night when his radical Black Muslim group launched a coup attempt.

His hands in the air, the controversial head of the Libyan-linked Jamaat al Muslimeen walked out of the State Television Station, his headquarters for the past five days, and was immediately taken under armed escort with several followers for questioning.

Security sources said a Libyan national was among the group of 120 Muslimeen who staged the coup attempt.

More than 20 Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) staffers held hostage during the crisis walked to freedom and were taken to an Army camp for medical tests. State radio said they looked tired and dirty. Otherwise, eyewitness said the TTT employees appeared well.

Another batch of hostages, including five cabinet ministers, was later released from Parliament in the REd house, where they were held at gun point since Friday night when the rebels stormed the building.

The Muslimeen earlier had insisted on a presidential amnesty, including immunity from prosecution, as a condition for ending the crisis. By Wednesday, however, there were reports the rebels had become demoralized and were ready to surrender unconditionally.

Shortly after the capture of Parliament and the television station, Abu Bakr appeared on television to announce the overthrow of the government and promise general elections in 90 days.

The Muslimeen rebels face possible treason charges which carry the death sentence on conviction.

[Passage indistinct] rebels on Tuesday because of failing health, remained hospitalized on Wednesday. His condition was reported improving.

He was shot in both legs and was also reported suffering from vision problems, due to the absence of treatment for a degenerative eye condition.

A military spokesman, who asked not to be identified, said there would be no changes in the government, whose resignation had been a key demand of the rebels. The Jamaat reported earlier this week that Robinson had agreed to step down, and support his deputy, Winston Dookeran, as the head of an interim government pending general elections.

In New York, an adviser to Robinson launched an international appeal on behalf of the Trinidad and Tobago Government for donations of food and medicine. Napier Pillai, adviser on information to the wounded prime minister, said: "Food and medical supplies are desperately needed because the capital has been cleaned out."

A detailed list of the medicines needed ranged from aspirins to zinc oxide powder.

Stores in Port of Spain were empty in the wake of widespread looting that occurred after the attempted take-over.

The coup attempt was the second in 20 years.

## Hostage Release, Rebel Surrender Described

*FL0208015490 Bridgetown CANA in English 0135 GMT 2 Aug 90*

[Text] Trinidad, Aug 1, CANA—About 100 Black Muslim rebels freed their hostages and surrendered to Trinidad and Tobago authorities on Wednesday, ending a five-day coup attempt against the government.

Fourteen parliamentarians were released at the Red House (Parliament) and 30 media workers at the headquarters of the state television station. Both installations were taken by members of radical Jamaat al Muslimeen when the coup attempt was launched Friday night.

Outside Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) where the first batch of hostages was freed, Jamaat leader Yasin Abu Bakr set the example of unconditional surrender for his followers, laying down his weapon and peacefully walking into the custody of waiting defence force soldiers. The imam, dressed in his usual garb of white baggy trousers, white baggy shirt and Muslim cap, left television house with the air of a superstar under TV lights as a host of foreign and local media covered the event.

None of the TTT staffers were hurt during their five days in captivity.

Bakr and 64 followers surrendered at television house, the rebel headquarters throughout the ordeal, and were taken in a bus to a warehouse in North West Trinidad for questioning.

At 3:40 [words indistinct] and helictopers which took part in the massive release operation at TTT, arrived at Port of Spain's Hall of Justice, adjacent to the Red House.

At 5:14 P.M., the first parliamentarian, Sports and Culture Minister Jennifer Johnson stumbled out from the northern entrance of the Red House, beginning an evacuation exercise that lasted one hour and 45 minutes.

Following instructions from a soldier with a megaphone, Johnson, wearing a black skirt and a grey flecked jacket, came out along the street outside parliament and crossed to a waiting army troop carrier. She held a towel to her face as did all those exiting the parliament building. Soldiers told CANA the towels were to ward off the stench from dead bodies inside the Red House. Johnson was taken behind the army vehicle, used for cover from the windows of the Red House, where she was frisked by a man and woman wearing gloves. Army officials said everyone exiting had to be checked for wiring which could explode.

The other parliamentarians exited between 5:17 and 5:35 P.M. In the following order: Social Services Minister Gloria Henry, opposition member Kelvin Ramnath, Deputy Speaker Anselm St. George, Health Minister Dr. Emmanuel Hosein, Backbencher Eden Shand, opposition member John Humphrey, opposition member Trevor Sudama, Backbencher Raymond

Palackdharrysingh, Backbencher Govindra Roopnarine, Junior Minister Joseph Toney, and National Security Minister Selwyn Richardson. [words indistinct] MPs like Humphrey walked out in almost sprightly fashion, others like Richardson walked with pain.

Richardson, who was reportedly beaten by his captors, showed paramedics his wounds behind the cover of the army vehicle. The parliamentarians, three other people who looked like advisors and those left from the public gallery, were whisked off in to minibuses belonging to the state-owned public transport service corporation (PTSC). There was then a delay of some ten minutes as a large PTSC bus arrived and parked in the same spot below the Hall of Justice.

At 5:55 P.M., the first of the Muslimeen members walked out, starting a lenghthy surrender procedure in which the rebels walked out to the white line on the road outside, holding their rifles up in the air in one hand. They then turned and walked to the end of the road and put down their guns. Then each man crossed the road in front the Hall of Justice to be pushed to the ground where he would be roughly frisked by a soldier with gloves.

The first two Muslimeen members to exit did not carry guns.

By the end of the episode, which took until 6:50 P.M, there was a bus full of Muslimeen with their hands on their heads, and a pile of AK-47 and M-14 assault rifles on the other side of the road. One of the Muslims who officials identified as a former soldier, was specially loaded into the back of a truck surrounded by some ten soldiers.

The convoy of truck, buses, and truck with rifles then left towards North Trinidad.

After the evacuation was completed, Army spokesman Dave Williams said specialists would check parliament for explosives. Williams was unable to give a count of the dead bodies inside the Red House. Those who were caught in the crossfire when the rebels stormed Parliament Friday were left during the five-day ordeal. One body visible to newsmen from the hall of justice was bloated.

### Parliamentarian Wounded During Coup Attempt Dies

*FL0208020390 Bridgetown CANA in English 0147 GMT 2 Aug 90*

[Text] [passage indistinct] Leo Des Vignes, shot and injured during a rebel assault on Parliament on Friday night, died in hospital here on Wednesday, well-placed sources said.

Des Vignes, the representative for Diego Martin West, was carried from Parliament Saturday morning on a stretcher. He was shot reportedly whilst trying to escape his captors. The wound on his foot had swollen overnight due to the lack of medical attention.

Des Vignes was among 40 parliamentarians and other persons taken hostage when the Red House was seized.

In Jamaica on Wednesday night, Trinidad and Tobago's Foreign Minister Dr. Sahadeo Basdeo said the death toll, which stood at 21 on Tuesday, had risen overnight as a result of an unspecified military operation to secure the release of the hostages.

The 21 dead included 16 rebels, four policemen, and one civilian.

### Caricom Requested To Keep Troops in Place

*FL0208021690 Bridgetown CANA in English 0133 GMT 2 Aug 90*

[Text] Kingston, Jamaica, Aug 1, CANA—Trinidad and Tobago has asked Caribbean Community (Caricom) countries to provide food and medical supplies in the wake of widespread looting linked to last weekend's attempted coup by members of a Black Muslim group.

External Affairs Minister Sahadeo Basdeo told reporters that Port of Spain had also urged Caribbean leaders meeting here to keep Caribbean troops stationed in Barbados in place there until the situation in Trinidad is fully under control.

Basdeo, visibly relieved that the bloody crisis had ended Wednesday evening with the surrender of the rebels who had been holding dozens of hostages, said that the Caricom leaders had agreed.

"I made an official request to Caricom heads of government for assistance by way of medical and food supplies to take care of the need which has arisen in the hospital and other institutions.

"Let me state that the resources within the country are adequate to deal with even this problem...(but) you will find that there will also be people attempting to jack prices up and so on, even though we do have the resources".

"We are asking the Caricom governments to provide these basic neccessities for us until such time that the transition is over".

Basdeo said that the coup attempt in his homeland "by a group of terrorists" has "not only made me emotional, but aware that there is something called a Caribbean family".

"Let me in that similar vein say I owe a great deal to the heads of government and on behalf of my country. I want to express my heartfelt thanks (and) eternal gratitude for the solidarity which they demonstrated from the very outbreak of the occurence in Trinidad and Tobago".

Basdeo said he had spoken with hospitalised Trinidad and Tobago Prime Minister A.N.R Robinson, who was among the hostages released and he had enquired about progress at the summit here.

The Trinidad minister insisted that the end to the hostage crisis was not brought about by any agreement being reached between the government and the Muslim group which staged the unsuccessful coup attempt. Officials in Port of Spain had said the rebels had surrendered unconditionally.

## El Salvador

### Ponce Hopes FMLN Respects San Jose Agreements

*PA0108180390 San Salvador EL DIARIO DE HOY in Spanish 31 Jul 90*

[Text] The Army hopes that the FMLN-FDR [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front-Revolutionary Democratic Front] will comply to the letter with the agreements on human rights signed between the Salvadoran Government and the rebels in San Jose, Costa Rica.

Colonel Rene Emilio Ponce [chairman of the Armed Forces Joint Chiefs of Staff] made that statement on 30 July at an event honoring journalists at the Military Circle.

Col. Ponce said that for the Armed Forces the signing of those agreements is "positive," as it shows that there is interest in confirming how the terrorists violate human rights. Those violations range from offensives that affect hundreds of families to the destruction of pylons.

Col. Ponce noted that although the document has some points that could affect the procedures followed by the security corps, finding adequate measures when making arrests should be no problem.

When a journalist asked what procedures were affected, Col. Ponce said that, for example, no arrests should be made at night, and that arrests cannot be made without a warrant. He added that "when a case is under investigation by an auxiliary office, some procedures must be followed that may not be advisable, but which are legal, because an investigation does not necessarily begin when a case has reached the courts."

Ponce said that it is also understood that the FMLN-FDR will not set any more buses on fire. He recalled that in the past, during demonstrations like the one held yesterday, bus owners are forced to lend their vehicles to transport the masses and if they refuse to do so, the buses are set on fire. He noted that yesterday four buses of route 10 were used by the AGEUS [General Association of Salvadoran University Students] to transport students to a demonstration. The bus drivers were forced to take them to the university campus.

Col. Ponce also condemned the murders of civil defense members, as occurred in Santo Tomas. He asked groups that defend human rights to report these cases and not only echo what the FMLN says.

Civil Defense members do not have a fixed salary; they are paid by the community, and in the case of death like yesterday, their families are left without any support, as they do not have any insurance coverage.

### Government Officials Discuss Peace Talks

*PA0208020290 San Salvador Domestic Service in Spanish 2215 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[News conference by Colonel Juan Orlando Zepeda, deputy defense and public security minister; and Deputy Foreign Minister Ricardo Valdivieso with local and foreign reporters at the Presidential House in San Salvador and moderator Communications Secretary for the Presidency Mauricio Sandoval—live; broadcast in progress]

[Text] [Sandoval] ... mandate of the Central American presidents' meeting in Antigua, Guatemala concerning each country's Armed Forces. As is customary, I am requesting that each participant ask one question concerning the issue that is being discussed. Please use the microphone because we are on the air; Radio Nacional is carrying a live broadcast of this news conference. Deputy Foreign Minister Valdivieso has the floor to make the introduction, then we will proceed with the questions and answers.

[Valdivieso] Thank you, sir. I am very grateful to all of you reporters for coming on such short notice. As you know, I just returned from San Jose, Costa Rica, where the Security Commission held a meeting. The Security Commission was formed through the regional presidential mandate that resulted from the presidential summit in Antigua, Guatemala on 16 and 17 June 1990. At this summit we urgently requested that the negotiation of security, verification, control, and weapons limitations be initiated in accordance with Numeral 7 of the Esquipulas II peace process.

The commission is composed of all the region's deputy foreign ministers, and included as a logical concession, although it is not stipulated in the Antigua Declaration, the presence of all of the deputy defense ministers, except in the case of Nicaragua, which was represented by General Humberto Ortega, commander in chief of the Sandinist Army. Having made this brief introduction, I would like to read the document that was signed and then we will be glad to respond to your questions.

The agreement is called the Agreement of the Security Commission and it is datelined 31 July 1990, San Jose, Costa Rica.

In accordance with the Central American presidents' mandate, contained in the Guatemala Procedure and the Antigua Declaration for the purpose of consolidating the pacification and democratization process, and generating a climate of confidence and security in the region, the Security Commission establishes the following goals:

1. To ensure that the regional countries' Armed Forces are of a defensive posture while defending their sovereignty, territory, and internal order, and not offensive.

2. To ensure that the regional countries' Armed Forces maintain a reasonable or proportionate and global balance of weapons, equipment, and troops in a manner such that they will not constitute a threat to neighboring countries.

3. To establish a new model of security relations among the Central American states, based upon cooperation, coordination, communication, and prevention.

4. To secure pledges concerning the presence of foreign military troops in the region.

In order to accomplish these goals, the commission established the following elements:

A. The definition of factors that must be taken into account in order to establish, through a mechanism, each country's military needs according to its realities, such as the size and location of its territory, population, geographic characteristics, and the characteristics of its border area.

B. An inventory of the weapons and military troops in each country.

C. The establishment of limits or, as the case may be, restrictions that may result from comparative examinations carried out in accordance with the previous points.

D. In order to confront domestic conflicts or subversive movements in the area, the limitations agreed upon concerning the number of troops and specific equipment for this type of situation may be surpassed. These increases will be subject to the established mechanisms of verification and control.

E. The revision and continuation of the negotiations that are under way concerning bases, installations, maneuvers, and foreign military advisers.

F. The establishment of verification and control mechanisms.

G. The commission will foster agreements to create a climate of both confidence between the area states so these states can be good neighbors and so that friendship, development, and cooperation can be strengthened.

H. Acceptance of the offers of cooperation presented by the UN and OAS secretariats general.

The security commission will hold regular meetings every 60 days. Special meetings will be held whenever necessary. The meetings will be held in the Central American countries by alphabetical order. The next regular meeting will be held in El Salvador on 10-11 September. Should a country report that its delegation cannot attend or should the country excuse itself from attending, the site will be moved to the next country in alphabetical order. In the September meeting in El Salvador, the factorization [factorizacion] and inventory-taking terms, the verification and control mechanisms, and the determination of advisors to be offered by the OAS and UN secretariats general will be decided. Their offer of services was accepted in this meeting. The two secretariats will be invited to attend as observers. The commission thanks Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela for their willingness to help the negotiations and regards as timely that the support offered by these friendly countries be handled through an agreement of the multilateral organizations that contribute to the task of this commission. The delegations of El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama thank the Costa Rican Government for its hospitality and attention, which contributed particularly well to the meeting's success. San Jose, 31 July 1990.

Thank you. We will now hear your questions.

[Sandoval] Alexis Adalberto Diaz of Radio Horizonte.

[Diaz] Good afternoon. Has any agreement been reached on when the demilitarization will begin in the area and the extent of each country's demilitarization?

[Valdivieso] This is a rather technical subject. It was necessary to continue the discussions that were suspended in Caracas on 10 December 1987. This discussion was suspended because the Contadora Group broke up, and as you know we began the discussion of the Central American problems. For this reason, paragraph 7 of the Esquipulas II agreement assumes the Caracas initiative of 1987. Before discussing the possibility of reducing armaments and armies of any of the Central American countries, domestic tranquillity and peace must be established in each country. This was stipulated for the first time in the Tela, Honduras, meeting exactly one year ago. In this meeting, three chapters were drafted. Chapter One dealt with the contras' demobilization. This was strictly a Nicaraguan matter. Chapter Two mentioned other irregular violent movements elsewhere in the region. Chapter Three concerned the situation in El Salvador, specifically the FMLN [Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front]. As you know, Chapter Three is about to see results because of the goodwill of both President Alfredo Cristiani's government and the FMLN. Consequently, those countries that attain domestic peace can reduce the number of weapons and soldiers.

[Sandoval] (Isa Cuellar) from TELEPRENSA.

[(Cuellar)] I would like to know El Salvador's position regarding reducing the number of soldiers, considering that this Army includes irregular forces.

[Valdivieso] At this meeting, no reductions were discussed, but broad objectives or outlines as well as procedures regarding those objectives were established. El Salvador's position, which we feel is the position of any country in the region, corresponds to what we may call a coefficient of logic. In other words, we are talking about a radical change in the philosophy of violent movements in our region, where they have awakened and realized that they are limited regarding the political opportunities that were available to them a decade ago. Therefore, we

feel that many of those movements have decided to return to the normal life as citizens. Therefore, the moment this happens, El Salvador, like any other country in Central America, will reduce its number of troops and armaments to what is strictly necessary to safeguard the country's sovereignty and internal peace.

So we feel that in this meeting of the security commission a consensus was reached by the five Central American countries and Panama as an observer concerning reducing the armies and their armaments. This will allow a reduction to be effected as soon as possible to reinforce the utilization of resources in other areas. So this is the view of all of the Central American countries, not only of El Salvador.

[Sandoval] [Name indistinct] Telemundo.

[Reporter] Thank you very much. Good afternoon. You said there was consensus, but it is not exactly known on what, because the last two questions have been sort of [words indistinct] a little vague. Sir, specifically, what did Nicaragua promise, because it has one of the largest armies in Latin America.

[Valdivieso] All of our countries made a commitment to return to, to revise and to go on with the Contadora agenda of 10 December 1987, which basically involves the following three areas: reduction of armaments and manpower; reduction of military maneuvers; and, of course, control and verification.

Now then, we thought that if we delved into specifics such as a particular weapon or a specific caliber we would be placing the cart before the horses and this was too premature because this is a very technical area, and we had to define first the broad objectives and the procedures, for instance, how often the security commission will meet, where, and how it will operate in regard to the OAS and the United Nations.

This topic is in itself quite complex because the United Nations offers countless services which would have to be analyzed in order to be able to use the two multilateral organizations. Why? Well, you know very well that all of our countries on the Western hemisphere [words indistinct] Paraguay during the 20th meeting of the organization, to use the OAS to strengthen the OAS. So, what functions would the OAS perform so as not to conflict with the United Nations? These topics have to be analyzed exhaustively, and it is quite difficult to get into these minute details befoer taking up those main goals or objectives. The colonel will now speak.

[Zepeda] This will be a quick explanation because [words indistinct] what was agreed to by you. However, if you read the objectives in more detail, one of the main ones is that the nature of the Central American armed forces or armies will change. They will change from offensive to eminently defensive forces to protect their territory, sovereignty and internal order. This means a great deal. As you know, Nicaragua has a primarily offensive army. It has grown in an inordinate or disproportionate manner, compared to those of the other Central American countries. The quality of the weapons it has is what makes it offensive. For example, it has missiles, and planes like Honduras' F-5 planes [as heard]. All this makes it offensive and, in a way, disturbs the balance among the Central American armies.

I think that another important agreement is that we are going to achieve a rational equilibrium among the various armed forces or armies in Central America. It will be based on the individual needs of each country. We are saying that some factors have to be analyzed, such as territory, borders to guard, size of the populations. The geographical characteristics of the country and the border require that an army have a given nmumber of troops. We agreed that there has to be a balance among all Central American armies.

The other important agreement is that of defining or redefining our relations with regard to security, seeking Central America's integration. You know that we are now trying to establish blocs and economic integration. The armed forces also have to seek integration in matters of security based on understanding, mutual support and cooperation. This is what this objective means.

The last major objective is that of regulating the military maneuvers and the military bases that still exist in Central America. This is aimed at finding a solution to these problems, mainly those of Honduras, and to the presence of military advisers in Honduras and El Salvador as well as the presence of military advisers from Cuba and the Soviet Union in Nicaragua.

Therefore, we have to seek agreements. However, this is apparently theoretical. This is a commitment. We still have to reach implementation. This matter will be taken up later. We will meet again here in El Salvador to work out the mechanics. I think that if we analyze the objectives in detail we will see that they are quite large. I think that they are very, very large in scope and will have great repercussions on peace in Central America. I feel that this is perhaps a historical time because I think that, never before, has the political structure of the government, represented by the deputy forign minister, met with the military structures of the various government and countries to discuss the issue of peace in Central Amerieca. I think this step is historic.

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] in that meeting. We would like to know about it, please. No, no, no. I am asking about the Central American organization, please.

[Zepeda] Well, we did not talk about that, but we have discussed the possibility of using this organization, which has already been formally integrated. We need to strengthen it so we can achieve what we call integration and regional cooperation in matters of security. I believe this is where the Copecondeca [Permanent Commission of the Central American Defense Council] will come into effect. However, this can be analyzed later on.

[Sandoval] Ernesto Rivas from "Al Dia" newscast.

[Rivas] Col. Zepeda, I want to know how you discussed the FMLN problem in the country, if indeed it was discussed. We know that our country's Armed Forces cannot be reduced as long as the FMLN is still active. If this problem was discussed, how was it discussed and how will this problem be solved?

[Zepeda] It was indeed discussed, and it was one of the main concerns we had as representatives of the Salvadoran delegation. Here we have a problem of violence, we have a subversion problem. Here we have in the second part of the document ways to deal with these great objectives, so that the countries with subversion problem, this is what it specifically says, will not be subject to the limits that will be established in the subsequent meetings. The subsequent meetings will establish limits as to the number of troops and weapons, but the countries with problems of internal security, which still have groups that are working against the legal status of the governments are not subject to these types of reductions or limits. Probably, when they see the need for defense and security in El Salvador and Guatemala, our forces may be allowed to increase. That may be an option.

I find this quite contentious but we are going to determine this by means of charts, which are referred to here as factors. These factors are recognized by the United Nations and the OAS and they indicate how many troops and weapons a country must have in order to have not an offensive but a defensive army to preserve its sovereignty and internal order.

[Sandoval] (Osvaldo Agria) of "El Noticiero", (Edwin Gongora) of National Television [word indistinct].

[(Agria)] Col. Zepeda, did you discuss the U.S. military bases in, for instance, Palmerola, Honduras, and perhaps those in Panama?

[Zepeda] No. They were not specifically discussed because this is a very broad subject. We did touch on it. I want to be honest and sincere and say that we were somewhat nervous when we began talking about the attitude of the other armies, of the other armed forces, particularly those of Nicaragua. They are still an enigma and the one coming to represent Nicaragua's interests was Humberto Ortega. I think that more than anything he represented the interests of the Sandinist People's Army [EPS] rather than those of Nicaragua. The topic was not specifically raised but it will be a topic of discussion because I think that the general feeling in Central America is that the foreign bases and advisors have to be reduced. We, as sovereign countries, must chart our own destiny.

[Sandoval] (Edwin Gongora), [words indistinct].

[(Gongora)] Did you discuss ending intervention by countries like Cuba and the U.S. through irregular groups as well as ending the assistance from some other countries that have had something to do with the area, with the conflict in Central America?

[Valdivieso] As you know, [word indistinct] Esquipulas II, this matter has always been touched on in all regional resolutions, at those in Tela, Montelimar, San Isidro de Coronado, and the regional forces have been asked not to use use irregular forces.

In this meeting specifically, foreign bases here or in any part of Central America were discussed for the first time. This topic will be revised. There is a regional will and consensus to limit, as much as possible, the presence of foreign military forces in our area.

The matter was not specifically discussed at this level. It will probably be looked into at the next meeting, which will be held within one month and nine days here in San Salvador.

[(Gongora)] Was any commitment made on a specific date to begin the demobilization? Also, has this government thought of the consequences of such a demilitarization since those forces have to return to the country's social life? Will they be appropriately reincorporated? What has been done to... [changes thought] Are you giving any thought to this?

[Zepeda] We are thinking about this.

[Valdivieso] Of course, a personnel reduction in any Army necessarily comes with the social consequence of creating an increased number of jobs and inserting the new labor force into the productive life of any of the Central American countries, especially ours. However, this issue was not discussed on this occasion.

I believe that specific issues such as these will be discussed after we have established the exact mechanisms whereby we will begin to reduce the number of troops in the different Central American countries' armies. We did not discuss this this time but, of course, this government is aware of the problem that it poses and it knows that the reduction must be gradual.

Of course, it is in the government's and our society's best interest to reduce the Army as quickly as possible within the limits of El Salvador's domestic stability, because the country is faced with the nonproductive expense of maintaining a large Army.

[Sandoval] [Words indistinct].

[Reporter] Good afternoon. My question is the following: Should there be peace in the country, how many troops will the Salvadoran Army be reduced to?

[Zepeda] That is a very hypothetical question. We all want peace. We must, as I said initially, analyze different factors: the population, the country's size, land, sea and, perhaps, aerial borders that must be guarded, and foreign threats. All of this will be decided when we meet again. I do not want to make definite remarks now because we do not know yet. It all depends on the level of violence

prevailing in El Salvador. Perhaps the answer to your question will depend on whether or not the FMLN exists, and whether or not it stops destabilizing and creating this wave of terrorism in El Salvador. Therefore, I would not venture to comment on this at this time.

[Sandoval] Epigmenio of Imevision.

[Epigmenio] Col. Zepeda, in view of worldwide events such as the end of the cold war and, in our region, the reduction of the Sandinist threat, the United States has been actively promoting the area's demilitarization; at times, as in Panama, it has done so in a somewhat harsh manner. What do the Salvadoran [words indistinct], who have played such an active role in the country's life over the past few years, think of this return to the military headquarters, this lessening of the Army's importance? How have they reacted, realistically?

[Zepeda] I believe that we are approaching an historic phase in our countries' lives in which there will be considerable changes. I would like to devote a little time to the examination of this era's character. There is an apparent disappearance of the Marxist threat or the East-West confrontation. However, we should not fully accept this. We must not be overly confident.

You pointed out, quote, the EPS, unquote. It still is a threat. I do not believe that an entire structure that has been trained in-depth, that has undergone full Army training, can be changed by the stroke of a pen or by a statement. The EPS is a Marxist-Leninist Army that is part of a political party. It is a highly political and politicized Army. Its character, ideology, way of thinking, and training has not changed. This is why we should not be overly confident.

There is a trend toward demilitarization to which we must adjust. America has also undergone a wave of democratization, but there are still some islands, or one island, Cuba. Just how far this wave of democratization will drag Cuba we do not know. I believe that we are preparing and should prepare to make our Armed Forces or Armies huge schools, schools to educate and train citizens, especially peasants, for a useful life. We must make a decision. We must attempt to establish a new profile of the man in uniform, the officer, so that he can adjust to our new society.

Perhaps future problems will not be ideological. However, I believe that political and, perhaps, economic and social problems will emerge. We will always need the Armed Forces or the security forces. I believe that the leading role in this new phase will be played by the public security forces because of the difficult economic situations that we are face with, not only in El Salvador but worldwide. We must strengthen our security and internal order structures. We may have to change the Armed Forces' roles.

I believe that the changes that are taking place are changing our path; they are forcing us to change the profiles that men in uniform, officers, soldiers, and troops, have had thus far. However, we are doing so in a progreessive manner.

As an example, I would like to refer at this point in a (?positive) light to one of our universities, a military university that is in the developmental stages, which will offer cadets the option of pursuing liberal careers as professionals in addition to their military careers.

In addition to being professional soldiers, they will also have the opportunity, according to their ability and their intellectual performance, to become professionals in the service of the Armed Forces. The roles awaiting us are considerably interesting. We have to be prepared. I think Central America must head for full democracy. This is perhaps the way. The Armed Forces should serve so these processes, which have been very weak to present, can be fruitful and become stronger. I do not want to be rhetorical in this answer, but I think the Armed Forces should become fundamental pillars of democracy [50-second station break].

[Sandoval] [Name indistinct].

[Reporter] [Words indistinct] has the possibility of additional joint action to eliminate this action by the FMLN?

[Valdivieso] I believe that regarding your question about the FMLN, that the peace process in our country is progressing very well. Esquipulas II and all the following resolutions have simply put into motion all the new situations of the present world. They have set into motion undeniable realities that cannot be undone. The use of violence for poltiical ends, as Fidel Castro will soon find out, has become bad business. It is a bad business because today political power in Central America can not be attained through violence. We would rather say that the signs in today's world are so clear that the only path left is democracy, participative democracy, not the excluding democracies, like the one that for a time tried to deceive us in one of the Central American countries. That country is now in a process of participatory democracy.

We say that the FMLN [five-second break in reception] are already realizing that political spaces have been opened. Unfortunately, whoever wants to participate in politics in Central America must make great efforts in investing resources, physical efforts, and must take risks. Any person belonging to any political party is taking a risk in these times. However, I would like to explain something about one of the encyclical letters of His Holiness the pope. Curiously enough, a year ago I heard [words indistinct] in the preparatory meeting held in Guatemala. Then the Costa Rican deputy foreign minister also, on the same date, but a year later, cited the same encycylcal letter. His holiness says that work uplifts man. Therefore democracy in Central America means a great amount of work by all of us. Without trying to be macho, but the Pope said it, we have to be real men, and we have to work very hard to achieve the democratization of our area.

I believe that this appeal can also be used for all the members, not only of the FMLN, but all people, who sometimes lose faith in what democracy can do. That is why we urge anyone belonging to an unconventional movement to have faith in himself, and his country. He must realize that it is time to leave that bad business of attaining political postions through violence. Now is the time to work hard, like His Holiness has asked us to do in his encyclical letter and to become real men within democracy.

[Sandoval] [Words indistinct].

[Zepeda] Well, I found the question rather vague and could not understand it. However, I will try to comment on the security forces, which depend at this moment on a central military structure, that is, on a military force.

As to whether their profile will change, it indeed has to change. I think, and will try to be brief on this, that we servicemen are not the repositories of the Salvadoran people's values. The repositories of those values are the various social, political and economic forces, and the civilian leaders. All of us, all of the Salvadoran people, are the repositories and not only the Armed Forces. I think we have to imbue the minds of the men in uniform, and most particularly those of the security forces, with these thoughts. They have to fulfill a function that ideals mainly to security and internal order.

[Sandoval] [Words indistinct] names of Carlos Rivera and (Franklin Mitchell). Is this a single [words indistinct]?

[(Mitchell)] With your permission, I would like to change the subject [word indistinct] and I have a question for Col. Zepeda. I think this is the first time he has appeared in a news conference open to [word indistinct]. For a long time we have had many questions to ask you about your supposed role, or alleged role, in the case of the Jesuits, about which all of us here know.

We have many questions but I would like to begin with a specific one. According to a letter supposedly written by young officers, there was a meeting at your office [word indistinct] on 15 November at 1500 and, according to the same letter, there was a second meeting at your office at 1700 on the same day. In addition, according the letter, at this meeting at your office there were many officers present and the case, or the problem posed by the Jesuits in the country, was discussed. I would like to ask you if it is true that two meetings were held at your office on 15 November and what topic was discussed?

[Zepeda] This question is quite direct and gives me the opportunity to counteract the false information that reaches your hands, which is mere speculation. I will emphatically say that no such meeting was ever held at my office. According to intelligence analysis, this letter, which is false by the way, comes from the FMLN. It is an attempt to discredit me primarily.

To begin with, I do not have any formal military command responsibilty. My functions are eminently administrative in nature. Secondly, no officer had any opportunity, or access, to the office of the deputy minister. In first place, I did not get to the ministry. My work as an adviser centered on the High Command at that time, when we were in the midst of an offensive. I reject these accusations.

These false reports were repeated by the CBS network for the main purpose of destroying the image of some people. I refer to the "60 Minutes" program because it was after that program that a report came to light. It presented a number of rather compromising shots. I would say irresponsibly, because when there is no basis to affirm something, to give a piece of news, or to make an assertion it is better not to release it because it becomes [changes thought] The objective is not to inform or to make known or to clarify but to deceive. This is what is happening in this case.

Well, I consider this as part of the political war that has been unleashed against the Armed Forces. I am not worried because regarding the case of the Jesuits, I have no responsibility whatsoever. On the contrary, I was one of those most strongly interested, at the level of the High Command, in having this case investigated and solved in a fair manner and having the true culprits prosecuted. Thanks to our efforts as member of the High Command; thanks to the efforts of the Commission on Criminal Activities, which many do not appreciate, by the way, the conclusion was reached that there was a group of the Armed Forces involved.

I would ask, perhaps you, and the friends here: what would have been best: to forget about the case, not to discover the murderers, or to investigate it? What would have been the best thing to do? Of course, one has to be fair in an investigation. This is what we are trying to do. So, I strongly reject this assertion. First, because it stems from a clandestine, anonymous source (?such) as the FMLN or some group interested in or linked with the leftists to hurt particularly some member of the Armed Forces.

This theory was raised at that time. Later on they turned to Colonel Ponce and later to President Cristiani. I think that the FMLN has to take advantage of this opportunity, as they say. However, there is a judge [nine-second break in reception].

[Valdivieso] Another thing, if there had been as large a group as you claim, some one or another would have had to come out and say: I was there. There is no truth to the charges.

[Reporter] I agree with what was said, because people cannot be accused without information, but I believe that in April of 1968 [as heard] you accused the Jesuits at the UCA [Central American University], of being allies of the FMLN, and also of being identified in some way with the military targets of the FMLN urban commands. Can you explain those statements that you made?

[Zepeda] Well, in the first place, I never mentioned the Jesuits. I never mentioned names, and certainly never mentioned Jesuits. I have never liked to criticize or accuse people without some grounds. What really led to my statements was the fact that at the National University and the UCA, meetings were being held to plan terrorism. That is all I said, because there are witnesses. There are students and their parents. There are documents. There are a number of documented facts that prove this. This is said by all the people. Most of the people say this. However, they were not brave enough to say this, for fear that the FMLN might act against them. However, this does not mean that they are responsible for [one-second break in reception]. That is not true. I never said that they are responsible for the murders. The fact that there are some links between the two universities is no secret. Ask many students and some parents.

This has been demonstrated, for example, when the First Brigade was attacked, as you know, on 25 May of the same year. Shots were fired from the National University. Murders were planned at the National University. There is a complete history of involvement. I am not saying that this applies to the entire university, nor am I referring to the university authorities, but some individuals inside the university were participating in these actions.

I cannot accuse the church, or the university, or the authorities. If the authorities permitted this, they were probably being threatened. Therefore, one should not confuse things. The thing is that the propagandists have used these statements that I made in order to try to involve me in something that I know nothing about.

[Sandoval] (Thomas Wilford), of THE NEW YORK TIMES.

[(Wilford)] Colonel, you praised the investigation, but from the outset, there has been a very serious contradiction that so far has not been addressed, that Colonel Rivas gave the Honor Commission a list of names which, I believe, contained 45 names. From this list nine people were charged suddenly with the crime and the Honor Commission said that it was only (?heeding) the recommendations made by Col. Rivas. So, from 45 names to nine names; who chose the names? This is only one of a series of contradictions that many people who are following the trial have noticed. Not only the president but the archbishop have described the trial as [word indistinct] of lies and an effort to cover up the facts and the criminals. What are the expectations, after eight months and so many contradictions that, at last, this case will be resolved?

[Zepeda] To be honest, you have forced me to discuss a topic that is restricted. There is a commission at the Supreme Court level, which is [words indistinct], and the only ones who have the personal authority to [words indistinct] are the defense minister and the president of the Republic.

I would not like to assert or deny whether the commission has made contradictory statements because the technical handling of this entire investigation has been carried out so far by the judge. I believe that if anyone has doubts concerning the truthfulness or legitimacy of the trial that the judge is carrying out with the commission he should appeal to the judge.

I do not want to make statements that will undermine what you have asserted concerning the contradictions. I would prefer if you asked those questions of the judge. I must say that he is carrying out the trial, and I believe that he must be fair to avoid making mistakes.

[(Wiliford)] If you will allow me, the investigation that you (?are praising) was the investigation within the Armed Forces.

[Zepeda, interrupting] [Words indistinct].

[(Wiliford)] [Words indistinct].

[Zepeda, interrupting] ...and I will not deny that. Over 500 Army troops were investigated; the entire investigation, in the first place, was focused on the Armed Forces. There was a theory that consisted of four possibilities, four groups. One possibility was that the crime was perpetrated by the FMLN, another was that it was the Armed Forces, another that it was perpetrated by independent groups that distanced themselves from the FMLN's power or responsibility, and another possibility was that rightwing groups were responsible. These are the four theories. President Cristiani then gave instructions to focus on the Armed Forces, and a big effort was undertaken. That is why I praised the effort.

It is not easy to interrogate and investigate over 500 people, to make [word indistinct], take fingerprints, and carry out ballistic tests on over 500 rifles. This is a huge effort. This is why I disagree when you say that the Armed Forces have not carried out an evaluation and when you fail to give the Army any credit for the effort it has made. What is important here, and I would like to take the advantage to say it now that so many friends from the press are here, is that you must evaluate the Armed Forces' effort to heal and cleanse the Army of the bad elements who made this mistake, which was a very serious and bad mistake.

I would also like you to evaluate how important it is for people, institutions, and individuals to have a place where they can demand justice and investigations. It is my turn to ask you now if, when the FMLN perpetrates murders, do the people have a place to go to? You have no place to go. The people have no place to go.

However, here they do have someone to go to. They have the High Command and the justice organizations. That is what we have here.

[Sandoval] (Tom Beal), of London BBC. Yes, you can ask the question in English.

[(Beal), in English] The FMLN in the last couple of days has been asking for the commission to be established by the United Nations, under the Costa Rica agreement to be moved forward and to act immediately rather than to wait until after a cease-fire. What will be the position of the government? They have asked the government and the FMLN to directly, particularly the United Nations [words indistinct] immediately. What will the position of the government on this?

[Zepeda, in English] I suppose that you are referring to the third commission that was celebrated yesterday in Costa Rica?

[(Beal)] No. No. No. The agreement between the FMLN and the government that was accorded in Costa Rica.

[Zepeda] Oh. I see. You have two questions.

[(Beal)] The FMLN has asked that the United Nations Commission, which is going to be set up to investigate human rights in the country to be established immediately, rather than to wait until after a cease-fire, and they have asked for the FMLN and the government to particularly and to set up the commissioners [sentence as heard]. What will be the government's response to this?

[Zepeda] Well, we would have to wait for the secretary general to inform us about this. We have [words indistinct] to try very hard not to speculate and not to devote [words indistinct]. We always wait for the secretary general to do it first. Right now, our position would be to wait for the secretary general or for his representatives to [word indistinct] presidential commission of peace and his dialogue negotiation. So, we would have to wait to see what he says.

[(Beal)] [Words indistinct].

[Zepeda] We believe that since we have [word indistinct] discipline, we are [words indistinct] to dialogue. We think that if we had not sustained this discipline, the dialogue would not have come as far has it has come. So, we believe the principle of discipline is very important. It has not allowed [words indistinct], it has not allowed speculations, which would only [words indistinct], so yes, we do believe in [words indistinct], one of the most important persons that ought to be processed.

[Sandoval] Thank you very much, journalists.

### Antel Workers Strike to Protest 'Small' Raise

*PA0108160090 San Salvador Radio Cadena YSKL in Spanish 1218 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] Workers of several National Administration for Telecommunications [Antel] departments have gone on strike to protest the 150 colones pay raise announced by the government, which they regard as too small.

According to the Antel labor union, more than 60 percent of the Antel workers of the San Miguelito, Roma, civil works, electric cables, telegraph services, general reception, and teleprinting departments stopped work early yesterday. The work stoppage is partial, but the measure could broaden if the Antel administration fails to comply with the agreements signed with union leaders in June, the sources said.

The strike lasted from 0800 to 1200 yesterday.

## Guatemala

### URNG Communique on Possible Renewed Actions

*PA0108203890 Guatemala City EL GRAFICO in Spanish 28 Jul 90 p 51*

[Communique issued by the General Command of the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity, URNG, in Guatemala on 17 July]

[Text] In view of the fact that there have been different interpretations of the El Escorial Agreement, we believe we must explain our position, which we maintained before and during the discussions prior to the signing of the El Escorial Agreement.

What does the agreement mean when it talks of the peaceful solution to the national problems, the elections, and the current electoral process?

As revolutionaries we must exhaust every possibility so the Guatemalan people can overcome the underdevelopment, dependence, poverty, ignorance, oppression, repression, discrimination, and terror they have suffered for centuries.

In the current circumstances, it is possible to find a path to peacefully resolve Guatemala's grave situation.

The peaceful solution of the national problems necessarily must entail the political solution of the internal armed conflict.

We believe the political solution must be based on the awareness and the agreement of the majority of the Guatemalan people about the historic and structural causes that generated the war.

The groundwork for the solution of the conflict would be laid if a functional and participatory democracy is built to incorporate all the country's social and political forces which share the objective of establishing a real democratic system.

The democratization of Guatemalan society entails the following changes:

1. Elimination of the civilian self-defense patrols, the development centers [polos de desarrollo], and the Siproci [Civil Protection Service].

2. Repeal of the decrees issued at the end of the de facto military government of Mejia Victores.

3. Reorganization, elimination, and investigation of police institutions and repressive forces, and complete subordination of the security and police organizations to the judicial branch.

4. Definition and delimitation of the state's role in the country's economic development.

The constitutional amendments proposed in El Escorial implicitly change the nature of the Guatemalan State. Such changes must be made by a National Constituent Assembly to amend all those articles that contradict or limit the exercise and construction of a real democracy, and to redefine the Army's role in the Guatemalan State.

The Constitution gives the Army a role that is not consonant with a truly democratic state. It has been turned into a center of power that influences political, economic, and administrative decisions.

The militarization of society generates terror and systematic repression, and fosters impunity, abuse of power, and corruption.

Most national resources are invested in developing a counterinsurgency policy and in accumulating power in the hands of the ruling class.

What does the URNG understand by changes and modernization of the country's economic structures?

It means rationing the efficient use of land, giving priority to the domestic supply of staple products, and promoting the production of the most profitable products for the nation.

It is necessary to lay the foundations to broaden domestic markets, thus increasing the population's purchasing power, to improve their living conditions, and to expand and develop international trade based on national interests. It is necessary to improve the land distribution and ownership system. Agricultural production is a key factor in our country's economy.

It is also necessary to establish the right to private property according to social needs.

Those measures would create the conditions for Guatemala's industrial and commercial development.

In the social field, there cannot be democracy unless the Indian population's political rights are recognized. They have a right to defend their cultural values and to demand attention to their social, economic, and political needs. There will be no democracy as long as their own local and regional forms of organization and their cultural expressions, their love for their land, and their historial right to own a piece of land are not respected.

The situation of dispossession, discrimination, and overexploitation imposed on the Indian majority should be admitted, accepting full responsibility for it, and corrected. It is necessary to establish an adequate political representation of all the country's ethnic groups in the country in all government institutions whose members are elected by popular vote. Oppression, exploitation, and discrimination must disappear.

The overall participation of women in social change is essential for the construction of a new society. Their rights must be recognized and their political and social role must be promoted as a basic factor when making changes.

We reiterate that as long as the minimum conditions for building a democracy are not present, we will continue struggling in all fields and participating in political life as a political and military movement.

At the El Escorial meeting, we said that we are not opposed to the electoral process. However, we are sure and convinced that it will not lead to the political solution of the armed conflict.

We said that elections are a functional mechanism of democracy and one of the ways in which to express popular opinion.

For elections to be legitimate, they must be held in a society without persecution and without systematic violations of human rights, a society in which all political and social sectors of the people can organize themselves and freely express their just economic and social demands without being repressed.

The free and sovereign expression of the people's will determines the democratic nature of a state.

The current electoral process, with its characteristics and conditions, is not the adequate mechanism in which to express the sovereign will of the Guatemalan people. We are convinced that as long as the changes that we proposed in El Escorial are not made, there will be no conditions to obtain the social consensus to uphold a democratic state.

However, as a goodwill gesture, we expressed our determination to the group of political parties participating in the dialogue not to carry out any actions against the country's present political process.

The URNG's attitude, which was aimed at making the peace process viable, has been met with an increase in the repression and terror against the poor masses. The purpose of these actions is to keep the Guatemalan people's hands tied so that they cannot express themselves freely.

Everything seems to indicate that the enemies of the peace process are interpreting our good will as a sign of weakness. They are once again mistaken.

We want to express clearly that if the repression and terror is not stopped immediately, we will feel we have the legitimate right and freedom to renew sabotage actions throughout the country and to carry out all kinds of offensive actions against the forces of terror.

The present wave of repression and terror is creating a favorable climate for those who want to return to the past. To go back would mean an increase in armed clashes and would provoke a generalization of the war.

The URNG will not remain indifferent to the sufferings of our people. As political and military representatives of the people, we fight for justice, democracy, and peace.

The group of parties expressed its political will to achieve those objectives. To remain silent now and not condemn the increased repression and outrages against the people would be inconsistent with the acquired commitments. We expect the parties to speak out and act against these actions.

The successful completion of the process we started depends on the fulfillment of the political will expressed by both sides. URNG General Command Commander Rolando Moran Commander Gaspar Ilom Commander Pablo Monsanto Carlos Gonzalez, secretary general of the Central Committee of the PGT [Guatemalan Labor Party] Guatemala City, 17 July 1990

### * Favorable Trade Balance Up 12 Percent

*90CA0080C Guatemala City DIARIO DE CENTRO AMERICA in Spanish 20 Jun 90 p 3*

[Text] The total foreign exchange income from exports and services during the first half of this year exceeded $1 billion, a figure that has not been reached since the last decade.

During the period 1986-1990, annual cumulative growth in total foreign exchange income was 12 percent, resulting mainly from the increase that occurred in the flow of exports. The upswing in that income is encouraging, if one considers the fact that its performance during 1982-86 was unfavorable, posting a negative rate of 6.0 percent.

Within the total foreign exchange income during the five year period under discussion, receipts generated by exports had an average share of 55.5 percent, followed by those related to private capital, with 14.8 percent; banking capital, with 11.9 percent; and other types, making up the remaining percentage.

Prominent in the evolution of this income is the fact that, in 1990, a positive variation of $132.7 million was achieved, in comparison with 1989. This constitutes the highest figure during the aforementioned period, equivalent to 22 percent. This result was influenced decisively by income from exports of both traditional and nontraditional products. Nevertheless, emphasis should be placed on the flow of private capital and tourism; because there was an obvious recovery in the former during 1990, when it reached a total of $54.5 million. The latter figure contrasts with the reduction to only $26.5 million that occurred in 1989, after it had stood at a maximum level of $151.2 million in 1988. A dynamic expansion was perceived in income from tourism, on its end, since it exceeded $43.7 million in 1990.

### * Minorities Unrepresented in Congress

*90CA0080B Guatemala City PRENSA LIBRE in Spanish 21 Jun 90 p 4*

[Text] The dissident deputy from the Christian Democracy (DC) political party, Diego Velasco Brito, claimed that, even with the election of 112 deputies, ethnic minorities and workers would never be represented in the Congress of the Republic.

Deputy Velasco Brito declared that this has been proven by the designations made by certain parties, such as DC, National Union of the Center (UCN), and National Liberation Movement (MLN), among others, which have formed their slates without including Indian representatives or those from the labor sector.

He added that, unfortunately, among the 112 deputies who will be arriving in the next Congress there will only be quantity, and not quality, in terms of the congressional composition; "because I am sure that many representatives, as on this occasion, will be there only to raise their hands."

Deputy Velasco Brito's position coincides with the statement made by the National Vanguard Party (PAN), noted, Ricardo de la Torre, spokesman for that political organization. He deplored the fact that there are only a few deputies representing Indian sectors of the population, such as the deputy from Quiche, Diego Velasco Brito.

De la Torre remarked that 112 deputies for the next legislature will put coordination between the government party and UCN to the test, something which has always been denied by its leader, Jorge Carpio, though recently supported by his deputies in the Congress.

## Nicaragua

### Humberto Ortega Discusses Army, Government

*PA0208033290 Managua Sistema Nacional de Television Network in Spanish 0030 GMT 28 Jul 90*

[Interview with Defense Minister General Humberto Ortega by Vice Presidential Minister Dr. Antonio Ibarra in Managua on 27 July—live]

[Text] [Ibarra] Our special guest tonight is General Humberto Ortega Saavedra. Today we will begin a program in which we expect to discuss some burning issues. We will ask Gen. Ortega for his views on various issues. We will begin by mentioning that I first met Gen. Ortega during my early years in high school when, together as members of the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth, we were able to undertake various tasks. We supported the slogan at that time which was: Neither with the left nor the right, but a step forward. However, we later followed different paths. General Ortega, do you remember when you were a member of the Nicaraguan

Patriotic Youth in the early 1960's? I would like to begin with the following question. There is great concern among various sectors of the population, and there have been reports in Jinotega and Matagalpa, about the resumption of conscription. Youths are reportedly being brought back into the Army. What is your opinion?

[Ortega] That is not true. Conscription has been completely suspended since the enforcement of the Military Patriotic Service Law was suspended. That law permitted conscription for active duty. However, as part of the process of restructuring and professionalizing the Army, we are hiring young men from various parts of the country to implement, in a professional manner, a new voluntary method through which young men are hired for specific salaries and sign contracts for a minimum of two to three years. This is what is currently happening in some regions of the country. It seems that citizens who have learned about these actions have misinterpreted them.

[Ibarra] Gen. Ortega, what can you tell us about the serious concerns regarding military secrets in this country? There are various reports on the number of weapons. How many armored vehicles does Nicaragua have?

[Ortega] Based on the doctrine of national defense of our country, we considered the possibility of having—as part of the ground forces which is the kind of army that the doctrine and strategy for the defense of the country and the sovereignty demanded—sufficient armored vehicles to meet the needs of the country. This lead us to have in our ground forces not less than 150 armored vehicles of the type.... [changes thought] We have exactly 154 T-54 and T-55 armored vehicles in our Army.

[Ibarra] I have another question, General. There has been great concern for years over the presence of foreigners, international military advisers, in Nicaragua. There have been Soviets, Cubans, Koreans, and advisers from other countries. How many foreign military advisers are currently in the Army, where are they, and what kind of advisory services are they providing? Do we still have this kind of foreign advisory service?

[Ortega] Here in Nicaragua, as part of the effort to build a new army to replace the one the Somozist tyranny used to repress the people, we obviously had to count on the support of trained military advisers. For many years, just about until 1988, the majority of the experts....[changes thought] We never really had advisers; they were experts in different fields for the needs of the army. Most of them came from the brother Republic of Cuba, which always provided a significant contribution in this respect. The majority of these experts, or the largest number of them, came during the most intense years of the war taking place in Nicaragua. But there were never over 1,000. Over the past two years, there were approximately 150. After the elections, that figure dropped to 80. Not long ago, about two months ago, Cubans decided to withdraw their military mission from Nicaragua. At present, there are no Cuban military advisers or experts in Nicaragua.

However, Cubans do have a military attache here, through the Foreign Ministry, as do other countries like Venezuela, Mexico, the United States, France, and so forth. As for the Soviet Union, we have a very small mission of experts. That mission was always small. The number of Soviet experts never went over eight. That figure has remained more or less unchanged. The chief purpose of this mission is to coordinate the aid required by the army to strengthen itself in general terms. We never had the large number of Koreans and Bulgarians mentioned in the past. On some occasions, small missions came from Korea, but we never had the thousands of experts on a permanent or stable basis mentioned by the enemy propaganda against the revolution.

[Ibarra] Gen. Ortega, there is an issue of concern for many citizens, especially those who have been abroad and have learned about the path of the General Directorate of State Security, formerly linked to the Interior Ministry, which has now been transferred to the Army. What are the duties of this agency within the Army? What is their role?

[Ortega] As part of the process to improve the Army, which we began implementing about two years ago, and also as a consequence of the decisions the government headed by Violeta Chamorro has taken to speed up the process to reduce and reorganize the Army, quick steps have been taken to structure, with a new concept, the various services and organizations the country required during the war, when a different situation prevailed. In this regard, what has been organized in the Army is a special directorate of information for defense. It is based on the experiences of some countries in Europe and other parts of the world. The security tasks are now limited to investigation, search for information, and the respective classification. It no longer has the duties that the General Directorate of State Security—which no longer exists—had in the past; that is, to prosecute and detain citizens, as well as other duties that were required during the war situation that existed. Therefore, its structure, its profile, and its duties are now completely new. It works in close coordination with the Government Ministry, a ministry that now carries out the orders to detain and prosecute those under investigation.

[Ibarra] General, those who have known you for many years, including those who have been against your participation in the current government and those who have supported your long career as a Sandinist National Liberation Front [FSLN] political leader, have expressed a specific concern. In addition to your military role, you have also played a political role for many years. People wonder who has taken your place in the FSLN National Directorate now that you are no longer a member of that organization.

[Ortega] As far as I know, no one has replaced me in the post I had occupied within the FSLN National Directorate since 1979. I was part of the struggle to overthrow the Somozist dictatorship and part of the difficult and historic Nicaraguan struggle to affirm its sovereignty and to clear a new path for our homeland. I do not think it was necessary to replace me within the FSLN National Directorate.

[Ibarra] General, Alfredo Cesar, secretary general of the National Assembly and leader of the Social Democratic Party, has a certain thesis, which states that our country's transition toward democracy has been easier because the inheritors of the Third Faction, both within the National Opposition Union [UNO] and the democratic opposition and the FSLN, have contributed toward creating an atmosphere that led us to the elections and to the peaceful transition to the government of national salvation headed by Violeta Chamorro.

As author of the document that in October 1977 established the insurrectional strategy within the FSLN, otherwise known as the FSLN Third Faction, and which led to the FSLN victory, how do you view Alfredo Cesar's thesis?

[Ortega] At a certain time during the struggle against the Somozist tyranny or the Somoza dictatorship, it was possible to open a political compass and to give a certain flexibility to the very orthodox, dogmatic, and structured positions that our early leftist and revolutionary formation had bequeathed to us. During the early 1970's it was very difficult for us to be mature enough to promote and believe in a more flexible program of struggle.

In 1977, however, an FSLN group was able to.... [changes thought] because at that time the FSLN was divided in three factions. Each faction advocated a different way to overthrow Somozism and take over power. I would say that their differences were not mere tactical differences. They were significant differences as far as their strategic plans to overthrow the dictatorship were concerned. At that time, we participated in an entire debate that even divided the FSLN into three factions.

At a given time, we headed one of those factions, known as the insurrectional or Third Faction, which emerged with a broader plan. Then the Group of Twelve was created, and we began calling on other groups in the country that had not been taken into consideration before for sectarian reasons to participate in the struggle against Somoza.

From then on, the struggle intensified considerably. We are all familiar with those historical facts, and therefore I will not go into detail. All the Sandinist factions reunited around an insurrectional plan, without which it would have been impossible to unify the people to overthrow the tyranny. Logically, the development of more flexible positions—less rigid, principle-minded, or orthodox—always existed. That also made it possible for the revolutionary leaders—as we gained maturity—to adopt new positions in accordance with Nicaragua's reality, which despite the war, difficulties, and criticism from the enemies of the process at that time, opened the path that led to the 1984 and 1989 elections. Both elections created possibilities for strengthening a unique and new democratic system in Nicaragua, which never before existed in our country.

[Ibarra] Regarding the democratic goals of the Third Faction, which were frustrated and will need further development, I would like to hear your comments regarding international dispatches according to which your brother Daniel Ortega, who is in Cuba at this time, has advised Fidel Castro not to hold elections in Cuba. According to those reports, some political groups have reportedly demanded elections in Cuba and your brother Daniel has told Fidel that there is no need for elections in Cuba. What do you think about that position adopted by your brother Daniel?

[Ortega] First of all, we must note that each historical process, each country, and each people have their own characteristics, and therefore we must respect the situations and decisions made by their leaders based on their own realities. In that regard, I cannot say that something that is happening in Cuba, on which we may have different views, is good or bad. As for Daniel saying this or that, you know how news is reported, so I would say that it is better to wait for his version.

Regarding the situation here in Nicaragua, it is clear that the Nicaraguan process believed it was just and correct to hold the 1984 elections, and also that the 1989 elections were just, correct, viable, and possible for our people and the revolution.

[Ibarra] Your personality is marked by two contradictory characteristics, in the sense that you are a historical leader of a revolutionary process, of a political party such as the FSLN, and at the same time you are commander of the Army of Chamorro's democratic government. The question that naturally arises following your previous statement where you say that your ideas on possible elections in Cuba are not clear is this: What are your ideas on the elections that took place in Nicaragua? What are your ideas on the need to hold elections in a democracy? What place do free, secret, and direct elections take in your idea of a democracy? What I want to ask you is: What is your idea of democracy? What is your idea of democracy vis-a-vis Chamorro's, the national salvation government's, and the Nicaraguan democratic sectors' ideas of it? Do we all have a common idea of democracy? So as to continue this debate and discussion, and to satisfy the citizens' demand for information, could you tell us, General, in a few words, what your idea of democracy is?

[Ortega] Surely. Here in Nicaragua we have always struggled to live under a democratic regime, and this effort had always been frustrated, boycotted, or hindered by difficult circumstances and by backward forces. These efforts were also frustrated by outside forces, such as past

policies toward Nicaragua by different U.S. governments, and also due to the way the privileged few dominated the country ever since the last century. It was therefore never possible to build an independent country with a democratic regime for all our people. It became necessary to overthrow the Somozist dictatorship at a very high cost of sweat and blood to start seeking that democratic process that claimed so much blood from our people. We need to point out that at this time ideas on how to promote a democratic process differ, but we do have a clear framework of reference—the Constitution. This permits us to draw the different positions closer so as to strengthen the democratic regime that Nicaragua is demanding so much. With the Constitution, which was perfected over all these years, and within the framework of the country's general laws, we began to clearly promote a democratic path, which, although it may not have all its points polished, has obviously advanced more than the processes in other Latin American countries. We held the 1989 elections, despite the adverse situation the revolution was under at the time. The revolution showed much consideration during the entire electoral process, and displayed great will toward the electoral goal.

Of course, elections in Nicaragua were an important part of that democratic process that we now want to consolidate and firmly uphold for the future. The elections came about during a very difficult and special time because they took place amid crisis, amid war, and amid a great polarization between the various political and social forces that comprise Nicaragua. Despite all this, the elections were held and they became a decisive factor in attaining peace in Nicaragua. I believe we should appreciate this important element to help us better understand the situation we are currently undergoing.

In addition to being an important factor in our democratic regime—which has since become gradually stronger—I believe elections were a determinant factor in ending the war. It is true that the counterrevolutionary forces had already lost the war from a strategic point of view, because they could not topple the Sandinist regime or defeat its army with their weapons. It is, however, also true that the struggle against the counterrevolutionary was difficult for the Sandinist Army. Ending the war took much more time and required more bloodshed and sacrifices from our people because the fighting took place in remote jungle and mountainous regions and the counterrevolutionaries were supplied directly from Honduran territory. Our situation was very difficult. Some guerrilla movements, for example, the one in Colombia, have existed since 1948, that was the time of Eliezer Gaitan and Bogotazo, a liberal movement that took place there. There was a great outbreak of violence and thousands were killed.

[Ibarra, interrupting] One of the people's leaders was murdered during those events.

[Ortega] Correct.

[Ibarra] I believe Dr. Fidel Castro was a student representative and participated in the Bogotazo.

[Ortega] That is correct, he did participate in those events. There have been guerrilla wars in Colombia ever since that time and it has been very difficult to end them.

The military situation needed a permanent solution that considered all viewpoints, military, diplomatic, and political. This was true of the meeting of the five Central American presidents, which has come to be known as the Esquipulas process, and later confirmed with the Sapoa Agreements, which were the most important step toward ending the conflict. Undoubtedly, the elections played a very important role in the disarmament of the forces supported by the previous U.S. Administration, led by Ronald Reagan, which was exerting pressure. The elections politically disarmed the administration, making it impossible to continue supporting with active military aid this unjust war being waged against Nicaragua. We were convinced that regardless of who won, either the FSLN candidate Daniel Ortega, or Violeta de Chamorro, the elections would have a positive result. It would allow the end of this cruel and painful war that our people were enduring.

Really, this is how it was. Once the elections were held, the armed counterrevolutionary project was disarmed. The war was then unjustifiable. The electoral process had been so clean that it was possible for Violeta to assume power, and for the Sandinists not to oppose her assuming power. When she assumed power, this upset even more the plans to settle the problem militarily and through violence.

This new government continued with the previous difficult negotiations begun in Esquipulas, Sapoa, and during other intense negotiations in 1989 in Costa de Sol, Tela, San Isidro de Coronado and others. The negotiations were continued and with the ability and patience shown by the present government leaders, Violeta as well as Antonio Lacayo, we were able to conclude the peace process with the counterrevolutionary forces with the leaders of the National Resistance. We also participated in some of the negotiations so that they would disarm and end the war forever here in Nicaragua.

[Ibarra] Since you have mentioned my boss, Minister Antonio Lacayo, because I am vice minister of the Presidency under him, I would like to ask a question regarding Antonio Lacayo. There is speculation throughout the country—and he has also been asked about this—that you have a sort of secret pact with him. Could you tell us the nature any pact, if it exists?

[Ortega] We really do not have any pact. As Mrs. Chamorro has publicly stated, the government does not have any pact with the Sandinists. The negotiations on the transition process led to an agreement on 17 March by the incoming and outgoing government. Two commissions were appointed. One was headed by Antonio Lacayo and the other one was headed by me. What we reached in the commissions were agreements, but there

was no pact between the two commissions. There has been no pact either during the course of the communications on the various steps to guarantee that the agreement will be carried out. There has not been any pact at any time. Going back to the question that you asked regarding my position on the current situation, the democratic process that we are living, once peace has been attained—we thought and I firmly believe—would enable Nicaragua's gradual economic recovery. The formula was elections will equal peace and peace will equal economic recovery. And the basic economic recovery was equivalent or is equivalent to establishing the firm basis for peace to emerge from underdevelopment—the critical situation of poverty that exists among our people—toward forms of development that will bring happiness to our people.

[Ibarra] Allow me to interrupt General on that question of peace. How strong is our peace? We have statements by Daniel Ortega on his visit to Cuba in which he says that Nicaragua is on the verge of a civil war. National Assembly President Myrian Arguello has commented on a power vacuum in Nicaragua. We have statements made which were attributed to the vice president of the Republic regarding a constitutional crisis in Nicaragua and that other parties will have the possibility of attaining power before the end of Mrs. Chamorro's six-year term. There is a situation of tension. How solid is the peace that has been guaranteed, especially if we could see during the past strikes acts of violence by leftist extremist groups who promoted confrontations and shootings in Managua. How solid is the peace to which we all aspire? Will that peace permit a climate of national reconciliation to exist or is it that national reconciliation has to be the mechanism to consolidate that peace?

[Ortega] As you well put it, there are several situations that are still tense. It is necessary that the leaders of the country, whether in the political, economic, social, or religious context, all the leaders of Nicaragua, who have the great responsibility of representing the people, think calmly and seriously about this situation that, unfortunately, still persists in our country. I have said that to promote democracy, which has cost the Nicaraguan nation so much, and which we have been forging little by little, amid the war, the contradictions, and the past polarization, especially during the last elections, it is important, necessary, and vital that we advance once and for all to consolidate the peace that has cost our people so much sweat and blood, and has left so of our people maimed and dead. Therefore, our great big task and the big duty of all citizens, mainly of the leaders of this country, regardless of their ideology or political trend, is to make every effort to consolidate a peace which, first of all, is deserved by the heroes and martyrs, the victims of our people and of our nation.

There can be no pretext or justification here for any political leader, any political or ideological movement, or any citizen to resume—no matter how difficult or critical the situation may be—armed violence and the terrible, tragic, and bloody specter of a war that we Nicaraguans do not want to experience again now or in the future.

Undoubtedly, it will be impossible to obtain the formula I mentioned without peace. In other words, elections helped to secure peace, which generates economic recovery and in turn helps to establish the foundations for the economic development of our country. This is what we revolutionaries struggled for. Revolutionaries have struggled since the last century for better living conditions. They have fought with dignity and with a humanitarian and social purpose. We have suffered too much.

We are about to end this century; it will end 15 years from now. It is not possible to begin the year 2000, leaving our children with a country that is destroyed and that, for various reasons, is suffering from an economic crisis that is putting us behind developed countries in Latin America.

[Ibarra] Gen. Ortega, can national reconciliation be obtained despite the presence of extremist groups that may lead us to violence; of armed groups in cooperatives or neighborhoods that may lead us to confrontation; and of sectors that are organizing brigades and death squads. Certain observers recently showed me and Danilo (?Lacayo) a list of groups emerging in Masaya and other cities which call for the execution of Danilo. I also saw a list of other groups, such as self-styled high command and salvation brigades, which are calling for violence. In other words, is it possible to reach national reconciliation in a climate in which there are far left and far right groups pushing people to confrontation?

[Ortega] National reconciliation is not only possible; it is of utmost importance to save Nicaragua. If we Nicaraguans do not take action with a deep sense of reconciliation to solve problems, Nicaragua will be lost. I believe that in this sense, we must resort to practical experiences. Here in Nicaragua, in the middle of the war, when the Sapoa process was taking place and when the war was still very intense, it was possible to have Sandinist People's Army soldiers and officers establish direct contacts with contra members—leaders of various units—who were killing each other on the battle field. In Sapoa, it was possible to begin establishing communications, a minimum of understanding, and the foundations for peace. Shortly after this, a unique example in the history of modern world and in the history of armed conflicts took place in Nicaragua. This is the first time an army—the army of the counterrevolution which had about 20,000 men—ended a war through a negotiation process in which a satisfactory solution leading to peace was reached. This was the issue. The point was not to kill the last contra; that was not the issue. The goal was to kill the unjust cause they were supporting; it was to politically kill that plan. If anyone was killed in that attempt, it was because there was armed opposition to that effort.

Therefore, if we do not have a profound concept here; if there are no real steps to establish communication and to search for the positive aspects each man and each opponent has; and if we do not set aside bitter and quarrelsome speeches, which all media in this country have initiated and which virtually prevails everywhere, then we will not be able to create the essential conditions that the country urgently needs.

We have attained peace, thanks to great efforts. However, if we do not consolidate it in the months ahead, we may have truly dramatic situations, which nobody in this country wants. We may even have situations that may get out of our control and lead to further sorrow and suffering and the country's total division. As I told you, we may begin a new century, leaving our children something that is not fair to past or to future generations.

In this respect, the reconciliation and peace that is to be consolidated must go through the following stages. First, we must make a greater sustained effort to maximize the process to disarm the counterrevolutionary forces in rural areas. Just as the government has a very important role and responsibility in complying with the agreements made through the negotiations, so do the Army and the warring sides, chiefly, the peasants, whether Sandinist or contras.

They bear the great responsibility of not falling into a direct confrontation with machetes, knives, or weapons they may still have to settle their differences. Nicaraguans are quick to resort to violence. That constitutes the historic legacy of so many years of backwardness and exploitation. That must disappear. Pacification in rural areas is vital.

[Ibarra] How do we achieve that without disarmament, general? I have information, provided by the Army, that 26,386 weapons were collected in the country. My question is, considering that so many weapons are still in the hands of communities, what serious efforts are the Army and the Government Ministry undertaking to withdraw those weapons that intimidate and spread insecurity among the people? Also, how can we ensure that the weapons collected by the Army do not get back into the hands of the people? What controls are being enforced to ensure that those weapons are permanently put out of circulation, so that there is only one authority in this country that can legitimately use force, in accordance with the Constitution?

[Ortega] As an armed institution, we have displayed seriousness and professionalism, despite the limitations and difficulties we still have. The same can be said for the police and the Government Ministry. Lack of trust in our actions and our commitment to the Constitution and the demands of our people gives rise to some doubts as to whether we are honest or whether we are pretending to collect weapons and then returning them to the people.

I have personally told all the Army chiefs to act with great responsibility in that respect. As military authorities, we are very aware of the danger that armed civilians pose, especially since there is no longer a war going on in the country. Unfortunately, there is profound political polarization among a number of groups and, if these groups are armed, that political polarization could lead to armed confrontations that would harm the population and force the military authorities and the police to take appropriate measures. We would reenter that terrible [words indistinct].

[Ibarra, interrupting] Is there any control over those weapons?

[Ortega] Yes there is. The Army has been strengthening its organization and control mechanisms. All the weapons that have been confiscated are under military control. We had and have a permanent Army column that takes action during especially tense circumstances—for example, when the United States invaded Panama. At that time, the sovereignty of the Nicaraguan Embassy in Panama was violated, and our relations with the United States grew more tense. During that period, we distributed thousands of weapons among the [one-second break in reception] part of the national defense system.

In the same way that the Army distributes weapons, it also recovers them. Because of the Army's ability to recover weapons, we have quickly collected and stored over 26,000 weapons. However, the situation is much more complex because there is a significant number of weapons that are not under army control yet and we need the cooperation of the population, the responsible citizens, and the Nicaraguan people in general. For example, although the counterrevolutionary forces destroyed most of their weapons, we know that there are some arms caches out there. However, we trust that the time will come when the counterrevolutionaries will become aware of the country's new situation, laws, and order. They will report the location of those caches and turn the weapons over to the appropriate authorities.

[Ibarra] What are the possibilities of destroying those weapons?

[Ortega] It was agreed to destroy war zone weapons. As for the rest of the country, there was great uncertainty because of the marked political polarization that occurred during the elections that the Sandinists lost, and because during the election campaign, many Sandinists saw UNO as the armed contra movement and the UNO extremists saw the Sandinists as a force that had to be exterminated once UNO won the elections.

[Ibarra, interrupting] There was also a marked revengeful attitude.

[Ortega] Yes, so many people who had weapons and had not reported them hid them. Insofar as time goes on and insofar as we promote this plan along with the Government Ministry and the National Police, we hope that throughout the year we will recover.... [changes thought] basically thanks to the support of the population, which will have more trust in the general situation. It is not

possible for each Nicaraguan to want to protect his or her interests from what it considers fair or unfair, because that is anarchy.

The country has government institutions such as the Army, the police, and the Government Ministry, which guarantee the citizens' safety. We cannot allow the creation of brigades of national salvation. During the most recent crisis we experienced when the people erected barricades on the streets and a more critical situation occurred in the case of Radio Corporacion, some journalists stated that since the military and security authorities did not have a more clearly active participation in the events, it was only legitimate for the people to find ways to exercise authority. Where would we head along that path? We would head to chaos and anarchy, which do not contribute to the peace that our people want.

[Ibarra] Our pastor, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo has said that the government's foremost responsibility is to protect the citizens and guarantee public order. Regarding the stability you have mentioned on several occasions as necessary for economic development and investments, is it not necessary to first guarantee that there will be no chaos or anarchy here?

[Ortega] Yes, that is right. I have already told you that elections had to be the equivalent of peace and peace goes hand in hand with economic recovery. If there is no peace, there cannot be economic recovery. If there is unrest and uncertainty, there cannot be economic recovery. How can there be foreign investment if the situation is not attractive? I would say that the main condition for resolving economic problems is a stable economic situation within the framework of a democracy that we are trying to save.

Whoever thinks that the idea is to overthrow this government has not understood that the Constitution says that there will be elections every six years and that in a democracy there are alternate governments.

Once the election period is over, responsible parties have two main tasks to tackle during the six years that must pass before the next elections take place, the same tasks that were tackled during the past elections process and that were viewed by the Sandinist Front as the main tasks: peace and the country's economic recovery through elections. These two goals, peace and economic recovery, directly produced the elections.

The Constitution clearly establishes that in 1996, there will be elections. So no one inside or outside of the country, consciously or unconsciously, has to think about how to make this government fail or how to promote its failure, so that it collapses in a few months, before 1996, and so that the agent of this failure may supposedly gain more votes or political support. No one should think this way, because if this government fails, the entire country, which requires economic recovery, would suffer. Why would any political force want to be at the head of this government if there is nothing to distribute among the people?

We must create wealth to distribute it equitably and fairly among the people, especially among the working class that has suffered the most in recent years. It is important to have the disposition to work for the most humble sectors of the population.

We need to produce reconciliation and total peace in the countryside within the next few months. Some contra extremists are already threatening to respark the armed struggle because the government has not been able to satisfy some demands for goods made by contra development centers.

What is happening? If I were to act based on how soldiers and officers who for many years have endured very difficult economic conditions and live on very low salaries feel—and if I were to say: If my situation is not drastically improved, I will put the tanks on the streets and crush everybody—what would happen in this country? There would not be a way out of this tragic and terrible circle that Nicaragua has endured for over a century.

As I see it, the leaders of this country must think about what to do, how to do it, what to create, what attitudes to abandon, and how to be more humble and more open. They must be able to set aside attitudes that lead us to violence. They must promote whatever contributes to understanding so that, little by little, we may have what has been called national reconciliation and so that we may be able to pacify the countryside, which is enduring serious social deterioration levels that are made evident by increased cattle rustling activities. Thousands of heads of cattle have been rustled. We are not going to say that this is an activity of the contras or of sandinists. This is a problem all of us must face because the way the situation is developing, if we do not have a climate of peace and order soon, the country will become anarchic in some areas. This is a dangerous situation.

[Ibarra] Can the people of Nicaragua, who voted for change and democracy in this country's elections, count on the Army to defend stability and constitutional order against any coup attempt, riots, or situations aimed at preventing new elections in six years to seize power through force and not through the people's votes? Can the people count on the Army to prevent any violation of constitutional order?

[Ortega] We are an armed institution that exists in the framework of the Constitution. For years, prior to the elections of 1989, we had proposed to the government of then President Daniel Ortega that we had to dissolve the party-state alliance because such a situation does not allow the Army to develop the professional and institutional profile it needs.

In the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev has realized this fact and has separated party militants from state

jobs. We are becoming increasingly aware of the need to respect institutional order as established by the Constitution.

We are going to fulfill our obligations. I have said that this Army is going to respect the Constitution and that we are not going to overthrow any government, as is done in other countries of Latin America and the world. We are not going to overthrow this government, headed by Violeta Barrios, which you call centrist...

[Ibarra] Centrist, yes. Democratic...

[Ortega] Or a leftist government that could emerge in 1996, or any government. The Army, as an institution, will never carry out a coup d'etat against any government. We have also mentioned that the Army we have been forging for over 10 years will never be a repressive force that violates human rights.

[Ibarra] But will it be able to maintain order?

[Ortega] We are never going to fire on the people. However, it must be understood that the fact that the Army will act prudently, responsibly, and based on principles, does not mean that we are going to tolerate chaos and that anyone may try to represent authority and produce anarchy. But you can be sure that we are going to contribute to the peace process.

[Ibarra] You say that stability is essential to have economic recovery. What do you think of the strategy of the various sectors? It has been said that nowdays you meet with the Higher Council of Private Enterprise [Cosep] and other groups. How true is this?

[Ortega] I am meeting with all of the country's sectors because I believe it is important that we, as an armed force, listen to the opinions of religious individuals, businessmen, workers, union members, and the various political forces, so that we can play our role and make contributions.

[Ibarra] What about the initiative of Ramiro Gurdia, who apparently still sees party and government or party and state as a unit? He has called for an agreement between the private enterprise, Cosep, and the Sandinist Front to form a political party. [two-minute break in transmission] favorable to the country's economic development?

[Ortega] Before answering your question, I want to insist that it is essential to achieve a climate of peace and reconciliation as soon as possible. This is vital. That way we are going to have economic recovery more quickly. This is what we all want: all the fighters, all the revolutionaries, all those who died, and all those who struggled to get Nicaragua out of poverty so that Nicaraguans could have a better life.

[Ibarra] This postulate is different from that which speaks of sacrifice for the sake of sacrifice.

[Ortega] Of course. The people must make sacrifices because of the difficult, harsh, and drastic economic measures that they have been enduring for many years as a result of inflation and the distorted situation that the war has created in Nicaragua. The government has to see that the sacrifices are made by all sectors of society and not just the workers and the most humble sectors.

[Ibarra] Do you think this is what Ramiro Gurdian wants?

[Ortega] No. I think that the call for an agreement among the labor sector, private enterprise, and the government to face the difficult adjustments that the current economic measures demand is the right move.

I think there must be an agreement among the government, acting with responsibility; the workers, also acting with responsibility; and the private sector, of course. I have heard labor leaders say that they are aware of the critical situation and that they would be prepared, in the framework of an agreement, to make things work out.

This would be a true agreement. I think that once this agreement exists—if there is a climate of peace, if the tone is lowered, if we can understand each other, and if we have better communication—then the agreement that must be secured will resolve the needs of our people in a more significant way.

The sacrifice that is needed for this concerted effort, which I believe should be shared by society in general, not only by the poor, and that will take several years...[changes thought] If the concerted effort is successful within the next four or five years—despite the harsh economic measures that the country must implement—then today's sacrifices will be paid back with the gradual welfare that the people will experience in the future.

Today's sacrifices will be no good if we do not understand the need for a strategic concerted effort. In a few years we will be asking the people for more sacrifices than the ones we are currently demanding. What are we going to do then? The time will come when people or society in general will have no strength left to survive.

I believe it is important for people to understand what stability is so that we can promote this democratic regime, which we have opened already. Here in Nicaragua, a great achievement of the Nicaraguan people and of the revolutionary process in the last few years is that we have now been able to come up with a democratic regime, which I believe, will last 25, 30, or 40 years because it is based on the Constitution.

It is important to understand that the Constitution cannot be violated. No political force can violate the Constitution because then the framework is broken and we would all be heading once again to tragedy and war. That is why the government of Mrs. Chamorro emerged from a revolution, which was able to enact a constitution that allowed for a succession in government and the

entry of a new government in this democratic regime, which will have new governments every six years.

I do not understand how there can be people here thinking about something else when the Constitution is clear. To achieve stability, political parties must first think about a concerted effort to improve the economy. Political forces must support a concerted effort needed in the country. I would add the following: if a concerted effort to improve the economy fails, the responsibility of the government, the workers, and private businessmen, would historically be a big one. It would be a sacrifice for the entire nation and population, which is demanding that an agreement be reached to overcome this dramatic situation little by little. That is why I believe that this negotiation, this understanding, and this concerted effort is essential. An agreement is the only solution. If there is no agreement, our country could go down the drain; it could be destroyed.

[Ibarra] How can we help create this general climate of a national dialogue so that, instead of having strikes and riots or revengeful extremist rightwing or leftwing positions, the population can work toward a national social agreement?

[Ortega] This is why I was telling you that the first goal should be to reach an accord. The government already made a call to reach an agreement and we should do it. Political forces, political parties, and other social forces in the country—such as religious groups and the media—should hail this effort and should help reach an agreement. Reaching an agreement does not mean there will be losers or winners. It should be an agreement in which the entire country and its people will win. If no agrement is reached, I foresee such an unstable and insecure situation that we may lose control of everything because of the consequent chaos and bloodshed. We do not want that.

Therefore, the first great responsibility of political forces is to create suitable conditions. This involves all political forces according to their specific roles, political forces in the country which obviously have greater strength and influence, and the smallest political forces. The media, religious sectors, and especially the political parties should join this effort so that, through their indirect influence, we will have results. If we see it from this viewpoint, there are two great concerted efforts. One is an economic agreement, and the government has already called on all sectors to work on this. Such a concerted effort has to yield some results. The other is a direct or indirect concerted effort among political forces so that the economic concerted effort yields results. The economic concerted effort has to be seen from two viewpoints: First, we need to discuss measures to lessen the burden caused by unavoidable harsh measures, which are part of economic adjustments to fight inflation and other economic problems. We must avoid hitting the most needy sectors and even private organizations, such as small producers.

Therefore, we must assess how to implement measures without resorting to insensitive methods that have been implemented in other countries in response to other situations. Such methods generate situations like the incidents in Venezuela where thousands protested, looted stores, and were repressed by the government, resulting in thousands being being killed. Hence, the government must determine the measures it will adopt. It must decide whether it will grant minimum subsidies or take other measures. I do not know about that. I am not an expert in those matters.

[Ibarra] I believe that a national dialogue may lead to an agreement.

[Ortega] Correct, but I believe that dialogue should already exist within the economic concerted effort. However, it is necesssary to find out how to lessen the burden on the most needy sectors. In addition, economic policies for the next few months and the next few years should be drafted within the economic concerted effort to complete the stage of what could be called the basic economic recovery. Then, two or three years later, we should assess the initial concerted agreement, which should be updated along the way. Every few months it would be necessary to review compliance with the agreements: what has been fulfilled, is unfulfilled, and what adjustments must be implemented. Then we can move on to more sustained and stable economic development.

Obviously, if we have a political force here that thinks that the success of this economic plan or effort will weaken its political position to reach...

[Ibarra, interrupting] Maybe they want to sabotage it.

[Ortega] ...to reach the government in the next elections with greater political support, it will not clearly back up this effort.

[Ibarra interrupts] Or maybe some people want to sabotage it.

[Ortega] This would be a mistake because the main tasks of the political forces in the post-election period are to work toward meeting the needs of the country and, as a political force, to help resolve the needs of the country, namely, peace and economic recovery. Later the political forces should gradually begin preparing, from a constructive opposition, for the next elections that will take place in 1996. At that time, the opposition will devise an electoral program to take over the government based on the positive and negative actions of the previous government.

We should not be afraid. In Costa Rica, the National Liberation Party [PLN] lost the elections this year at a time when the government headed by Oscar Arias had made enormous progress in various areas such as housing. Despite all this, they lost the elections.

At this point, I think that we have to distinguish in a responsible manner the tasks of the country, which all Nicaraguans should undertake. Given the transfer of

power, every six years each new government should promote the positive actions of the previous government to promote its future programs with greater security.

It is not right to stick the blame for everything that is wrong on the previous government because we will never be able to move on. In sum, we know we now face a totally new situation with many problems that we have to resolve.

[Ibarra] I want to ask you [changes thought] you talked about economic policy and economic strategy. I want to ask you a question. Every time I hear your opinion, I think it is related to the ideological and political presentations of the Nicaraguan Patriotic Youth Movement from the 1960s because it creates the necessary conditions to build a fatherland with national independence—a free country. However, when we talk about economic policy, you propose strategic options. We have very few options at the international level that give Nicaragua a chance for economic development. General Ortega, my good friend U.S. President George Bush has just made a proposal for economic integration on the American continent. What is your opinion of the Bush plan?

[Ortega] I think that Latin American integration is vital to resolve the serious problem of the foreign debt of hundreds of million of dollars and to compete in a very complex world.

These next ten years before the century expires [2-second break in reception] of the first ten years of the beginning of next century. The economic blocs are very well defined. In Europe, we see the formation of economic blocs, where even the USSR is playing an important role together with Western Europe, after the socialist system experienced a crisis. There is a marked trend by the Europeans and the Soviets to form an economic bloc.

We have Asian countries—such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia—which, headed by Japan, are forming another economic and financial development center in the world.

We have the Arab world which we are all familiar with. Capital tends to circulate more in those areas, while Latin America is being left behind.

Undoubtedly, if Latin America does not unite and does not join the region to defend itself in the face of what is envisaged for the next century, we will be at the tail end of the underdeveloped countries.

[Ibarra] We will not be defined in the world market, we will have lost our place.

[Ortega] Yes, of course, because integration is vital in order to attract markets for investment and commercialization. Logically, if Latin America does not integrate and if Central America does not integrate in an effort to defend itself in this dramatic world situation, then the situation will become very difficult. If we want Latin America to integrate, if we want Central America to integrate, then it is clear that first of all we Nicaraguans must unite. What moral authority will we have to demand that Central America integrate if the Nicaraguans are incapable of integrating as a whole. We have been witnessing how 40 or 45 percent of the Sandinist voters and 50 percent or so of the non-Sandinist voters are polarized. What is 40 percent, an arm, a leg, a member of the body and a piece of the brain doing if the rest, or 55 percent, is not functioning. The organism cannot function. And this is applicable vice versa. If 55 percent of the body wants to cut off a piece, the organism will not function. At present, the urgent task for Nicaraguans is to integrate ourselves into Latin America. I am not afraid of programs as the one announced by the United States. In this case, Nicaragua or Latin America must find ways of understanding with the United States. It must seek a respectful situation, as the one we have demanded. If that program provides a solution, then we must find a dignified solution for Nicaragua. We must also find a solution with Europe and any other country of the world.

[Ibarra] Apparently Mexico has already taken a position regarding that policy.

[Ortega] Mexico, Canada, and others.

[Ibarra] Mexico and Canada. To conclude, speaking of Central American integration and economic development, Mrs. Violeta Barrios de Chamorro has already set her policy on this Central American area. She has said that one cannot continue to build large armies while our countries need schools, hospitals, and resources for the country's socioeconomc development. I know that you will travel to Costa Rica where you will meet with delegates from the other Central American armies. Gen. Ortega, what prospects do you see for the Nicaraguan and other armies in the region to reduce in size so that a genuine Central American spirit will overtake the need to build barracks and instead build hospitals and schools?

[Ortega] We are scheduled to leave for Costa Rica tomorrow. We will attend a meeting with the president of the Republic to iron out the final aspects of the proposals that the Nicaraguan Government will set forth at this meeting. The important thing here is that in Central America there is a clear reality, which is historic. Most Central American countries, except for Costa Rica, have required the formation of an Army. Then, what is sought here, first of all, is to ensure fulfillment of the Contadora agreements, which were left unfinished after their third chapter. These were later taken over by the Esquipulas agreement. We are convinced that it is important to advance in these agreements for the good of the Central American countries. We began our reduction and restructuring process. We will go with a total willingness to find an agreement, an accord that will benefit the Central American region, considering the characteristics of each country.

However, we in the Army have taken the lead because we are already implementing a reduction process according

to Nicaragua's situation. The Army will never neglect the defense of the sovereignty, but should not become a burden to the battered economy of our country.

[Ibarra] Thank you very much, General. I would like to thank all our radio and television audience, and to assure you that this program is evidence that national reconciliation is a reachable goal.

Gen. Ortega, I believe that since the last time we saw each other, when you were at the corner of the Central Bank, back in 1960, when you were distributing Gregorio Seltzer's book entitled "The Small Crazy Army," until today, each one of us has progressed in this country through different paths. However, it is still possible to find points of agreement and joint objectives for the benefit of this fatherland that belongs to all of us. I want to thank you for coming to our program.

I also want to assure our audience that we hope to have Gen. Ortega back on this program as well as other government officials who can begin to discuss specific topics that need to be clarified to have a true national dialogue, which is an essential element in reaching a social agreement to attain social and economic development. Gen. Ortega, do you wish to make a closing statement?

[Ortega] Summarizing what we have discussed here, I want to say that the democratic regime we now have urgently demands total peace and reconciliation in the cities and the countryside. It needs weapons to be collected and extremists inside and outside the government, who are threatening constitutional order with their attitudes, to be buried forever. They cannot be tolerated. Therefore, it is necessary to strengthen this climate of tranquillity, promote reconciliation, and to reach a sound economic concerted agreement that will yield positive results that should be supported by the country and all political forces. We can be certain and should firmly believe that once basic stability has been obtained, Nicaragua will again be the kind of Nicaragua for which our heroes and martyrs struggled so hard, the Nicaragua for which Andres Castro, Zeledon, Sandino, and all the heroes of the revolution such as Carlos Fonseca and Pedro Joaquin Chamorro struggled for. In sum, the Nicaragua all Nicaraguans dreamed about and are longing for.

[Ibarra] Thank you very much Gen. Ortega. Good night.

### Labor Notes Discontent With 12 July Agreement

*PA0108200390 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 31 Jul 90 p 1*

[Text] Leaders of the National Workers Front (FNT) reported yesterday that the government is not honoring the most important points of the agreements signed on 12 July. They also said the government is creating conditions that are adverse to the national dialogue because it is implementing anti-popular measures.

After saying that the workers' position is to defend social stability, labor leader Ronald Membreno said the FNT agreed during a special session "not to participate in the national dialogue unless the government honors the 12 July commitments."

Membreno said that one of the most serious commitments undertaken by the government was to suspend the enforcement of Decree No. 10-90 and to leave as 8,500 manzanas the ceiling of land that can be leased from the APP [People's Ownership Sector] in the rural areas. However, Agriculture Minister Roberto Rondon continues to grant lease contracts to landholders that exceed 38,000 manzanas of land.

Membreno said that, along with the approval of land lease contracts, the bigger problem is that right-wing sectors organized by Vice President Virgilio Godoy are resorting to the illegal occupation of land. Both of these procedures, he added, endanger the lives of peasants and generate an atmosphere of tension.

As for the financing for the reactivation of industries, regional leaders Eligio Chavez and Leonel Cruz said the commissions have reached no agreement yet because the government delegates have no power to make decisions. In addition, the government delegates have demanded as a condition that workers relinquish their right to strike.

Labor leaders in the textiles and metals industry view this as "tricks to gain time, and, in the meantime, over 3,000 workers continue to face the risk of becoming unemployed."

Jose Angel Bermudez said that since the most recent agreements were signed with the government, over 400 workers have been dismissed by the central government or autonomous institutions. He added that the state alone has dismissed 64 employees, the Culture Institute 32, the Foreign Ministry 26, and six at other ministries.

The UNE [National Union of Employees] leader said employees are being dismissed despite the government commitment "to strengthen work centers and to provide a climate of confidence and stability for public servants of the central government and autonomous and state enterprises."

Meanwhile, Freddy Cruz, president of Conapro Heroes and Martyrs [Heroes and Martyrs National Confederation of Professional Associations] and also member of the FNT, said that Contruction and Transportation Minister Jaime Icabalceta, Education Minister Sofonias Cisneros, and Pablo Vigil, director of Telcor [Telecommunications and Postal Services], continue threatening professionals so they resign their posts.

UNE Secretary General Bermudez said that ANDEN [National Association of Nicaraguan Teachers], Fetsalud [Federation of Health Workers], and other organizations have already prepared proposals for the reclassification

of jobs which the government pledged to discuss in August. However, he added: "The labor minister has not summoned us yet."

Labor leader and Sandinist Deputy Damaso Vargas said the CST [Sandinist Workers Federation] will soon submit to the National Assembly a draft proposal of the minimum wage law which establishes the equivalent of $200 as the minimum salary for workers in the lowest categories.

### Rosales Views Labor Union Position

*PA0108223490 Managua Sistema Nacional de Television Network in Spanish 0200 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Italicized passages are recorded]

[Text] Labor Minister Dr. Francisco Rosales said he is surprised by the announcement over the media saying the FNT [National Workers Front] will not participate in the national dialogue. The FNT claims the government has not fulfilled the agreements signed on 12 July.

[Rosales] *We are very surprised because we have been holding meetings on a regular basis. We signed an agreement at the Olof Palme Convention Center at dawn on 12 July. The agreement says that we immediately had to establish a tripartite commission to analyze the textile, construction [words indistinct] and the metal-working sector, which would join the national commission to study the possibility of drafting a bill on minimum wages.*

Rosales added that the [words indistinct] meeting will be held today and that the government does not want to dismiss workers, but that it is necessary to restructure enterprises in the textile sector.

[Rosales] *We admit there is [words indistinct] poor management, an excessive number of workers, and that it is necessary to restructure these enterprises [words indistinct]. The restructuring involves a reorganization of the enterprises. Our initial proposal is to have the Coip [People's Industrial Corporation] submit in a short period of time, for example in 15 days, a plan for each enterprise in the textile sector. What should the plan contain? An overall financial plan that is feasible and that includes credits as an alternative to financial restructuring and capitalization through joint investments. In other words, there may even be privatization.*

He stressed that problems should be solved through negotiation.

[Rosales] *We have discussed this problem with labor organizations, and asked them to submit their specific proposals. This has been discussed with them. But obviously the CST [Sandinist Workers Federation] refuses to accept the possibility of establishing a clause that expresses the need to ensure social peace, discipline, and the necessary labor stability so the enterprise can recover in the economic aspect. The CST has refused to admit that conflicts have to be solved through dialogue.*

### Politicians on 'Brigades of National Salvation'

*PA0108175590 Managua BARRICADA in Spanish 28 Jul 90 p 5*

[Text] Guillermo Potoy, president of the Social Democratic Party [PSD], has told BARRICADA that the Political Council of the so-called National Opposition Union [UNO] has not discussed the formation of the Civic Committee of National Salvation, but they would have to discuss the topic before signing any document regarding the organization. Meanwhile, Eli Altamirano, leader of the Nicaraguan Communist Party disregarded the formation of the armed "Brigades of National Salvation."

The UNO, formed to coordinate actions during the electoral campaign and now fractured into two parts formed by five parties that openly support the government and nine others that support Vice president Virgilio Godoy's positions, began a process at the beginning of the month. According to some of its members, this process aims to "smooth out the differences to keep the alliance together."

Potoy expressed optimism over the results of the discussions. He said that in one or two sessions they will reach an agreement on the council's reorganization. In his opinion, the agreement should center around four points: support for the government, which they described as the government of national salvation; joint actions in the National Assembly; teamwork; and fulfillment of the national salvation program.

Eli Altamirano said that although there are problems and disagreements that must still be solved, including the lack of fulfillment of the UNO government program, the dicussions are moving along well. Altamirano stated: "The problems that caused the conflict have not been completely solved, but they have been put aside in order to give priority to the need to preserve the alliance as the path to solve the problems that are affecting the country in such a worrisome manner."

Although statement no. 1 of the "General Staff of the National Salvation Brigades" was distributed at the meeting where the National Salvation Committee announced its formation, Altamirano said that the committee has not formed any brigade or general staff.

Altamirano said: "Everything seems to indicate that that is a parallel movement of which neither the council nor the political parties or their leaders know anything." Altamirano added that his statements do not "underestimate" or "put down" anybody.

The politician said that in the next few days he will release an assessment of the activities carried out by some of his party members who occupy posts at the Managua mayorship, which according to several media, is preparing a harsh blow to the Managua residents' economy.

## Sandinist Military School Graduates First Class

*PA0108214090 Managua Radio Sandino in Spanish 0000 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] On 28 July at 1000, the Javier Guerra Baez Academic Institute held its first boot training promotion called "The Revolution Goes On."

The activity was presided over by Captain Roberto Picado, from the Central Directorate of the Sandinist People's Army General Staff; Captain Pablo Turuno Mendez, director of the institute; and members of the institute's staff and officers.

The results of the 1989-90 school year were summarized during the ceremony. The statistics report shows that 75 percent of the students passed the course and 50 percent of the students passed with averages higher than 80 points.

The vanguard student was Atrubal Espinoza Bonilla, with 90 points, and the distinguished student was Flavio Vanegas. Special mentions went to Juan Elicebet Mayorgas, Jorge Isaac Davilas, and Carlos Galeano Palacios.

The report shows that in spite of the country's difficult situation, the students satisfactorily benefited from the course, have a good disposition for studying, and maintain their trust in the revolution.

Parents participated in the ceremony. Afterwards, they met with the director of the institute to discuss plans that the young students have to go on with the Los Carlitos project, which will continue in Cuba during the next phase.

Congratulations to these young Nicaraguans who graduated with the slogan of "The Revolution Goes On."

## Argentina

### Seineldin Labels Alleged Coup Plot 'Nonsense'

*PY0108143690 Buenos Aires NOTICIAS ARGENTINAS in Spanish 1218 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 1 Aug (NA)—Colonel Mohamed Ali Seineldin, retired, has agreed with President Carlos Menem in describing the alleged civilian-military plot known as the "Spring Plan" for ousting the president as nonsense.

"The denouncement was unfounded" Seineldin said and added: "As it has been presented to the public, it isn't worth taking into account."

In statements to the newspaper UNICA EDICION, the military officer said: "It is a psychological campaign with several possible objectives," although he admitted that he "could not yet know" what objectives.

Seineldin remembered: "The same technique of denouncing alleged plots was used at other opportunities. The most notorious was when I was held responsible for the events that took place in the 3d Mechanized Infantry Regiment in La Tablada which, as everyone knows, was later proven to be false."

Seineldin said: "That was part of a great campaign aimed at creating a confrontation between the people and the Armed Forces." He said: "Under the current circumstances, it is dangerous to add to the serious problems of the Argentine people new uncertainties through ill-intended maneuvers that could lead to critical situations that are not desired either by the Argentine people or the Army."

Seineldin said: "The most absurd thing was to try to make my fellow countrymen think that I included a political crime in my plans" since this, he added, "is against my humanist and Christian beliefs."

### Government Seeks To Prevent Money-Laudering

*PY0208000890 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Dr. Eugenio Lestelle, program secretary for drug prevention and the antinarcotic struggle, has evaluated his activities during his first term in office at a news conference that just ended.

Lestelle announced the imminent signing of a decree by the president of the Republic aimed at preventing the money-laundering that stems from drug trafficking. He said:

[Begin recording] [Lestelle] After the decree is signed, we expect to have within the next few weeks a draft bill on systems to prevent money-laundering in our country.

[Reporter] This means that this matter will be discussed by President Bush and President Menem.

[Lestelle] There is no specific agenda on the matter of drug trafficking. I will answer one good question, and I ask you to pay attention to it. No specific agenda on drug trafficking has yet been outlined for the meeting between Bush and Menem, but it is quite possible that the two presidents will discuss the matter of money laundering. [end recording]

### Military Divided Over Antidrug Role

*PY0108123490 Buenos Aires DYN in Spanish 1848 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] Buenos Aires, 31 Jul (DYN)—Consultation among high-ranking Armed Forces members has led to the conclusion that the Armed Forces hierarchy is divided over an eventual involvement of the Armed Forces in the struggle against narcotrafficking; while the chiefs of the police and security forces are opposed to the idea.

This issue is included in the extensive agenda that Defense Minister Humberto Romero will discuss during his visit to the United States. Humberto Romero will start a tour through the United States on 1 August. This tour is scheduled to take him to Miami, Washington, and New York.

Originally, Romero was scheduled to leave for Miami last night in the company of Vice Admiral Emilio Osses, chief of the Joint Staff. But his departure was postponed until 2200 tonight because of a problem in the Aerolineas Argentinas flight schedule.

A well-known member of the generals corps has informed DYN that the Army High Command believes the Army may get involved in the struggle against narcoterrorism only if the "executive branch makes a specific decision in this regard, either through laws or through instructions issued by the president."

However, this position has been received with serious reservations by the leadership of the National Gendarmerie, which polices land borders; by the Coast Guard, which controls river border areas and Argentine sea waters; and by the Federal Police, which together with the other two, undertakes joint antidrug operations.

A recent meeting attended by high-ranking chiefs from the military, police, and security sectors yielded less than optimistic results regarding a real integration of these forces in the struggle against the drug scourge.

The meeting, to which DYN had partial access, was a mixture of the government officials' good intentions to have the Armed Forces undertake intelligence and complementary logistic activities to reinforce the antidrug struggle and the skepticism and pragmatism of the chiefs of the security forces regarding the effectiveness of such assistance.

The National Gendarmerie, the Coast Guard, and the Federal Police chiefs specifically upheld the position that a soldier is not professionally prepared to carry out a

police task which ranges from infiltration to a solid knowledge of the laws, to the different temperaments that must be adopted under extreme situations of arrest and clashes with [words indistinct].

The military command gave as an example the situation currently experienced by some Latin American countries, such as Colombia, where the Armed Forces actively participate in the struggle against narcoterrorism. Another particularly controversial issue is that concerning jurisdictions.

Some military chiefs are enthusiastic about the possibility of obtaining more resources to strengthen and deploy their weakened forces in border areas. Others take this with some reservations, while still others within the military reject the idea because they do not want to become a large police force.

The National Gendarmerie, which is also in charge of controlling airports, believes that the possible reinstatement by the Air Force of the until now inactive National Aeronautics Police, as was implied in this meeting, constitutes a Trojan Horse.

Finally, the Coast Guard views with great concern the possibility that the Navy may assume the control of the seas by using its frigates and destroyers to watch fishing ships suspected of transporting drugs.

Defense Minister Romero has told his closest aides that he is against any kind of mutations and that he prefers each institution to keep the role for which it was created. After his return from the United States, Romero will inform the president about the U.S. Government's intentions in this regard. It is believed that it is highly unlikely that there will be any decisions made in this regard in the short term.

### Defense Minister Romero To Visit United States

*PY3107184790 Buenos Aires Domestic Service in Spanish 1600 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] Defense Minister Humberto Romero today departs for the United States where he will remain for 12 days. He will meet with his U.S. counterpart Dick Cheney. Minister Romero will discuss the possible sale of Pampa airplanes, the obtainment of U.S. credits, and the struggle against drug trafficking. On 2 August Romero will visit the 7th Coast Guard District where he will listen to several lectures on the struggle against drug trafficking.

On 6 August Romero will begin a round of meetings with high-ranking officials of the White House, the Pentagon, and the National Security Council. Romero will also meet with John Brady, chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives, and with U.S. Secretary of Commerce Robert Mosbacher. The main subjects that Romero will discuss during these meetings will be: privatizations in the field of national defense, and the current policy of President Menem's administration.

## Bolivia

### Armed Forces To Join Antidrug Struggle

*PY0108122790 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 0000 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Navy Commander Admiral Anibal Gutierrez has stated that there is a resolute plan for the participation of the Armed Forces in the struggle against drug trafficking, but that the order must be given by the captain general of the Armed Forces, and the commanders of the three branches. Admiral Gutierrez added that the operations against drug trafficking must [words indistinct]

Asked about the U.S. support to the Navy, he (?denied) that this institution will benefit from the equipment mentioned in [words indistinct] which are smaller but faster boats. Moreover, the (Puerto Villarroel) shipyards will be prepared for the construction of boats in Bolivia.

Adm. Gutierrez added that the special training received from U.S. officers in Riberalta was quite satisfactory. He explained that Navy personnel were trained in handling boats and Pirana-type patrol boats that will be part of the necessary material for adequate control of the rivers in the struggle against drug trafficking.

The Navy commander added that the naval unit that operates with (?three other units) will have 35 troops and 16 boats. He finally expressed his satisfaction over the Defense Minister's decision to create the Navy Undersecretariat which will operate with its own budget, he concluded.

### Government Approves Agreements With Italy, Spain

*PY0108130890 La Paz La Red Panamericana in Spanish 1130 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] The government proclaimed two laws involving two international agreements signed by Bolivia with the governments of Italy and Spain. The agreement with Italy is for a $22 million credit for the purchase of goods and services for the construction of the second stage of the San Jacinto mining project. The other agreement, whose protocol was signed by Bolivia and Spain in Madrid last April, is for the reciprocal promotion and protection of investments in the two countries.

## Brazil

### Embraer Official Denies Report on Aid to Iraq

*PY0208030290 Rio de Janeiro O GLOBO in Portuguese 1 Aug 90 p 19*

[Report by Jose Eustaquio de Freitas]

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos—Embraer [Brazilian Aeronautics Company] Superintendent Ozilio Carlos da Silva has described as "sheer fancy" the remarks made by two professors of the University of Wisconsin, in the United States, on the sale of war materiel and the supply of technical services by Brazilians to the Iraqi Government. According to Silva, this speculation will not have any impact on negotiations for Brazilian companies to purchase two American supercomputers.

Ozilio Silva guaranteed that, after consulting the Pentagon, the U.S. Department of Commerce has already approved the sale of a vectorial processor [processador vetorial] capable of transforming the IBM-3090 computer purchased by Embraer into a supercomputer. He reported that financing and contracts are currently being worked out. Silva expects IBM to deliver the equipment within three months.

The Embraer superintendent recalled that, in any negotiation on complex systems, it is normal for the supplying country to establish conditions of use and clauses protecting technology. The Brazilian Government has already given the U.S. Government guarantees that the Embraer supercomputer will be used only for aerodynamic and structural calculations in aircraft projects.

Ozilio Silva stressed: "Embraer is not involved in any way with nuclear organizations, and it is absurd to assume that it would supply the means to make nuclear calculations of any kind."

Silva emphasized that Embraer and the Brazilian Government are not involved in any way with the deals made in Iraq by the consulting company HOP [expansion unknown], which is owned by Reserve Brigadier Hugo Piva, a former Aerospace Technology Center director. Hugo Piva made an agreement with Iraq to send Brazilian experts to develop missiles; this contract has been in effect since March 1990.

## Ministers Set Date for Initiating Common Market

*PY0208021890 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2200 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] The date for the initiation of the common market between Brazil and Argentina has been set for 31 December 1994. This was the main decision made by the foreign relations and economy ministers of the southern cone countries during a meeting at the Brazilian Foreign Ministry today.

Uruguay may also join the Argentine-Brazilian integration process. The ministers spent the whole day at the Foreign Ministry and only left the building to meet with President Collor at Planalto Palace.

A communique arranging the initiation of a common market between Brazil and Argentina and probably Uruguay by the end of 1994 was released during the meeting this afternoon. Chile has also showed interest in participating in this common market.

The ministers also discussed President Bush's initiative for the Americas, welcoming it but demanding a clearer definition; Bush proposes more open trade, reduction of the foreign debt, and more investment, but he does not suggest methods of attaining these objectives.

## Military Ministers Voice Concern Over Salaries

*PY0108131290 Brasilia Domestic Service in Portuguese 2200 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] The military ministers today met with Economy Minister Zelia Cardoso de Mello and with Justice Minister Bernardo Cabral to discuss the need to release resources for the operation of military units, and the need for supplementary credits for Army, Navy, and Air Force programs.

Another subject of discussion was the loss of the purchasing power of salaries of the Armed Forces civilian and military employees. According to Aeronautics Minister Socrates Monteiro, the depressed purchasing power of salaries was discussed to avoid a possible uneasiness in garrisons because of salaries.

[Begin Monteiro recording] This is the concern of the military ministers. We wanted to extend to the government this concern over the depressed purchasing power of salaries of civilian and military employees. We wanted to inform the government that the loss of purchasing power of salaries is great, and that this affects both civilian and military employees. We know that this demands a sacrifice. And this sacrifice is being announced as a motivation and an example to sectors of the nation that refuse to participate in this effort. There is no demand for a salary increase. We only wanted to show evidence to the Economy Minister that the purchasing power of salaries have been depressed. [end recording]

The Aeronautics Minister added that Minister Zelia Cardoso has promised to study the situation and that she will give an answer as soon as possible.

## Activities at Ford Plant Reportedly Normalizing

*PY0108132290 Rio de Janeiro Rede Globo Television in Portuguese 2300 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] Activities at the Ford plant in Sao Bernardo do Campo, Sao Paulo State, are almost normal. Metal workers who have been on strike for 50 days [number as heard] have returned to work. The enterprise began to pay the overdue salaries.

The morning shift workers went to the factory on their own because the company's buses were not yet circulating. However, only those working in the maintenance sector could enter the plant. The union of metalworkers held a meeting and asked the others to return home and come back at 0600 the following morning.

Inside the factory, where activities were suspended almost two months ago, maintenance workers began to

clean the machines and equipment. Only when these machines are ready will production return to normal.

The company buses resumed activities by the afternoon shift, and the workers were allowed to enter the plant.

Last week's riots are being investigated by the federal and Sao Bernardo police. Today, three security guards were called to testify in Sao Bernardo. Tomorrow, the president of the Sao Bernardo metal workers union, Vicente Paulo da Silva, will testify before federal police.

## Chile

### Argentina's Kohan Comments on Integration Process

*PY0208032690 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 25 Jul 90 p C-3*

[Excerpts] Alberto Kohan, Argentine secretary general of the Presidency, said on 24 July that sectorial integration should be promoted first "because each country's internal situation should maintain its own characteristics."

Kohan, who came to Chile to promote the bilateral integration process, said: "We understand that Chile will continue to maintain its own scheme, as will Argentina and Brazil, but if there are common interests, efforts should be made to implement them." [passage omitted]

Kohan reported that specific aspects of bilateral integration will be announced during President Menem's visit to Chile in August.

He said these specific matters will deal with the supply of gas, the elimination of impediments to travel, and the opening of border passes.

He added: "The whole integration process is already a definite political desire, and we are working toward definite goals." [passage omitted]

Regarding President Bush's initiative to create a free market zone aimed at establishing a common regional market, Kohan said: "This is proof that we are moving toward continental integration. The countries of the region are natural partners and friends. Latin America has to start taking a look at itself. The future of our countries is based on the its continental system, and we therefore welcome President Bush's initiative."

He said, however, that real integration should first be promoted among neighboring countries before moving toward continental integration. [passage omitted]

### Soviet Fishing Fleet Using Chemical Lures

*PY0108234890 Santiago LA TERCERA DE LA HORA in Spanish 24 Jul 90 p 14*

[Report by Juan Carlos Poli]

[Excerpt] Arica—A report by Chilean Merchant Marine sailor Luis Barrios Labra has caused a stir in Arica. Barrios Labra has said that the Soviet fishing fleet, using an advanced type of chemical lure, is plundering our sea coast, as they have done previously in the Mediterranean and Baltic Seas.

The information from Barrios Labra, who on several occasions posed as a Greek sailor and contacted Soviet sailors, revealed the use of a powerful chemical lure that attracts shoals of fish from as far as 10 miles away. The ships sail back and forth while the crew throws the lure on the sea. The ships then position themselves outside the 200-mile zone, and shoals of fish arrive as though attracted by a giant magnet. [passage omitted]

### Drop in Fishing Production Reported

*PY0108191890 Santiago Television Nacional de Chile Network in Spanish 1800 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Fisheries Under Secretary Andres Couve has reported that during the first half of 1990, the sector's production dropped by 16.6 percent compared with the same period in 1989. He reported that in the first half of 1990, the total production amounted to 2.713 million tons of fish, which accounts for 85 percent of the catch [as heard].

During a press conference, Couve rejected the critical remarks against his ministry about adopting measures without consulting the interested sectors. Our policy, he said, is based on participation, and all decisions have been made after consultations with the interested parties.

He added that during a special session tomorrow, the Chamber of Deputies will vote on a fishing bill that includes 110 Articles which have already been approved by the Finance, Agriculture, and Environment Committees.

### Discovery of Human Remains Near Calama Reported

*PY0108221290 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 25 Jul p C-7*

[Excerpt] On 24 July Interior Under Secretary Belisario Velasco confirmed the discovery of human remains 13 km from Calama, on the road to San Pedro de Atacama. The remains are reportedly from people who had been dynamited.

Velasco said that El Loa Governor Cesar Castillo reported to him that on 24 July "several human remains, jaws, skulls, and clothes of people who have not yet been identified" were found 500 meters from the road that links Calama with San Pedro de Atacama.

Velasco added that the case was reported to the Calama criminal court. Calama Judge Margarita Gordillo, archaeologists, anthropologists, and coroners will go to the scene to determine when the victims died and to arrange the transfer of the remains to the Calama Forensic Service. [passage omitted]

## Colombia

### Gaviria, Parties Agree on Assembly Agenda

*PA0108140090 Bogota Inravision Television Cadena 1 in Spanish 1730 GMT 30 Jul 90*

[Italicized passages are recorded]

[Text] President-elect Cesar Gaviria Trujillo and spokesmen for the political parties represented in Congress reached an overall agreement this morning on 10 basic points to be debated by the constituent assembly. This afternoon the party leaders will continue analyzing the document for the constitutional reform which will be the responsibility of the constituent assembly, to be comprised of 75 notables. The final text has been agreed upon and next Wednesday, 1 August, it will be made public.

The road to constitutional reform is becoming clear. This morning a preliminary agreement was reached on the proposal by President-elect Cesar Gaviria Trujillo to summon the constituent assembly. According to future Government Minister Julio Cesar Sanchez Garcia, it was confirmed that everything is close to being resolved.

[Sanchez] *A preliminary agreement has been reached. I think now it is only a problem of procedure, to iron out certain things in order to have the document drawn up by the end of the day.*

Regarding the contents of the reform that President-elect Gaviria proposed last weekend in a 10-point document, there is basically a political agreement.

[Alvaro Villegas Moreno, president of the Social Conservative Party] *It is a serious document, it is a well-structured document and it contains the president's own initiatives, all of which I believe have good intentions and are highly accurate. I will request some explanations on specific issues, but basically we agree with the proposal on the agenda.*

[Antonio Navarro Wolff, head of the 19 April Movement] *We are close, [repeats himself] we are very close to a political agreement.*

The agreement involves innovations in the organization of the state. There will be a change in the concept of such matters as defense, human rights, state of siege, public administration, and opposition parties. If the political agreement is firmly reached, the Colombians will go to the polls on 25 November to endorse the agenda and elect the constituent assembly members. Then the assembly would start sessions on 15 January 1991.

The number of constituent representatives, which was fixed at 50 by President Gaviria, could reach 75 representatives at the end of the political negotiations.

### Minister Denies Truce With Extraditables

*PA0108160390 Bogota Radio Cadena Nacional in Spanish 1200 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Text] Government Minister Horacio Serpa Uribe has said that the government has not signed any truce with the so-called Extraditables group. He denied reports saying that the government had ordered the elimination of military control over some municipalities in exchange for a truce with the Extraditables. The Extraditables recently offered to suspend all their violent actions, especially against policemen in Antioquia Department.

Serpa Uribe said that the elimination of the military control was based on the return of peace to the region, adding that the military and police forces played an important role in attaining this. He also said peace in the region will be consolidated and maintained with the cooperation of political, business, and labor sectors, the Catholic Church, and the citizens in general.

### Murder Supects Claim To Be Army Informers

*PA0108161190 Hamburg DPA in Spanish 1923 GMT 31 Jul 90*

[Text] Bogota, 31 Jul, (DPA)—It was reported today in Bogota that the four men arrested as suspects in the murder of Maria Esther Restrepo, distict attorney of the conflict-ridden Uraba area, have told authorities that they are army informers.

The district attorney and her bodyguard were murdered on 25 July as she was entering her office, in downtown Apartado, Uraba's main city.

After the murder, authorities arrested four male suspects in the crime. One of them, Oscar Montoya Martinez, accused of being the actual killer, was carrying a gun belonging to an Army officer.

General Adolfo Clavijo Ardila, commander of the Uraba Special Military Command, flatly denied the report of possible links between the killers and the Army. He said that the gun found on the suspect "had not even been fired."

Maria Esther Restrepo was investigating the mysterious mass kidnapping of 42 peasants who were celebrating a local holiday in a village in Turbo on 14 January.

According to investigators, the culprit was Fidel Castano Gil, head of an extreme rightist paramilitary group, because the bodies of some of the peasants were found in mass graves on his farm.

Uraba, a rich banana-producing region near the Panamanian border, during the past few years has been the scene of violent raids by guerrillas and extreme rightist armed groups.

*** Reasons for Military Changes Outlined**

*90SM0173A Bogota SEMANA in Spanish 26 Jun 90 pp 22-23*

[Text] It took Colombians by surprise. No one expected that toward the end of an administration such radical changes would take place in the Armed Forces. But the fact is that those involved were not caught off base. Generals Nelson Mejia Henao and Jesus Armando Arias Cabrales, chief of the combined headquarters and commander of the Army, respectively, had received hints that their military careers might end sooner than expected.

Two months prior to the 11 March elections, the government thought it might be necessary to launch an offensive against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). The guerrilla group had offered a pre-election truce, but it had violated the truce with military offensives, primarily in Meta and Cesar. At a Security Council meeting attended by the defense minister, Barco announced his decision. It was important, according to the chief executive, to make a distinction between guerrilla groups such as M-19 that were about to lay down their arms and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) that was already talking about demobilization, and the FARC, which was still on a war footing.

Minister Oscar Botero reviewed the public order situation and stated that the Army could not be involved in this offensive. It would be possible to contain the guerrillas' advance, he said, but not to take the initiative, as the elections required that forces be deployed throughout the national territory. As if that were not enough, he noted, the narcoterrorism problem was at a very critical point, and large numbers of troops had been assigned to protect the preliminary candidates and those running for congressional seats. These arguments were so convincing that the Council accepted Botero's assessment: contain but do not attack head-on.

Then it was up to the minister to meet with his generals and inform them of the conclusions. That was how those directly in command of the troops, Generals Mejia and Arias Cabrales, were notified.

But that was not the way things were to remain. In private, Gen. Mejia unleashed a barrage of words, blaming the meager results of the struggle against the guerrillas on the lack of political will displayed by the government, specifically, the president of the republic. Mejia's comments reached the ears of the president, who knew at that moment that the general would have to hang up his spurs. He did not give the general his walking papers right away for two main reasons. First of all, the country was on the eve of elections, and a shake-up of this magnitude could be dangerous. Second, the government wanted to wait for the outcome of the elections so that the opinion of the president-elect could be sought.

Mejia, for his part, was also aware that his comments were known to government officials. For that reason he decided to get the jump on any decision regarding his retirement. Without mincing words, he stated in public that the Army could take Casa Verde, but was not going to because it had no orders to do so. The general's intention was to give the impression that if he left, it would be because of his hardline position, which was well received in many circles.

But Mejia played another card as well: the capture of Pablo Escobar. Trapping the most wanted man in the country could be his salvation. It was then that, on the heels of the 11 March elections, he ordered an offensive by the Army troops stationed in Medellin. In this manner he also made it clear that the Army was committed to the battle against drug trafficking.

As for Gen. Arias Cabrales, although he was known to have objections to the peace process, the government considered him loyal. It thought that his presence in the high command could be upsetting to the negotiations with the EPL, however. On the other hand, he had a reputation as a hardliner. Not only had he directed the operation to take back the Palace of Justice, but his stint at the military headquarters in Uraba had prompted a large number of accusations from the Patriotic Union (UP) and other leftist organizations under his command. The human rights situation had deteriorated seriously in the region, primarily as a result of several peasant massacres at the hands of paramilitary groups financed by drug traffickers. In the government's view, Arias' problem was not, as the left seemed to insinuate, that he encouraged paramilitary actions, but that he had been ineffectual in his efforts to maintain public order, despite his reputation as a great tactician.

This was the state of affairs when the presidential elections took place. After Cesar Gaviria was elected, he met with President Barco to discuss the matter. It was then agreed that Mejia and Arias would go. This dovetailed with the incoming president's plans, as during the campaign he had emphasized the need to restructure the state security forces. This was more than a solution to possible problems for the present administration; it was a way to pave the way for the incoming administration as its own term drew to a close.

The changes that were made in the Army left just two 3-star generals: the current minister of defense, who will probably go into retirement when the government changes hands, and Gen. Luis Eduardo Roca, who will in all likelihood take over the defense portfolio in the Gaviria administration. Thus, the new president has an ace up his sleeve: The generals who will be in command of the troops in the future will have been promoted by him, which ensures greater loyalty and therefore a greater commitment to the restructuring Gaviria has in mind.

The changing of the guard, which in military jargon is known as the "run" and which usually takes place in December, a few months after a new administration has taken office, took place before 7 August this year. This

was made possible by the party government formula and the fact that Gaviria was a product of that very system. As a result, the president-elect will gain time and avoid any erosion in his relations with the military. As if that were not enough, it also shortens the time colonels must wait to become generals. In view of the shortage of generals, those who are colonels now will be called sooner than expected to go through the promotion course. What is in the workings, then, is a chance for Gaviria to launch a whole new generation of generals who will make it possible for him to make structural changes in the military institutions.

But the idea of restructuring is not Gaviria's exclusive brainchild. The Barco administration had been discussing this matter for more than a year, and last year at a conference at the Military Academy, the president handed the officers a kind of bill. On that occasion not only did he talk to them about the human rights policy in the Armed Forces, but he also reminded them of the resources that had been allocated for it. He concluded by saying that the problem was not a budgetary one, but a more comprehensive structural one.

If Barco was so clear on this, one wonders why his government did not undertake this task. The answer lies in the ensuing events. This has been a very difficult year for public order, especially given the wave of narcoterrorist violence with practically no let-up. Under these circumstances, when all public forces were urgently needed, it was not possible to make changes that risked undermining the loyalty and effectiveness of the military.

The debate that went on behind closed doors in the administration took on new dimensions when former President Alfonso Lopez Michelsen made some statements that hit the nail on the head. He questioned the effectiveness of the security agencies in the battle against drug trafficking, and expressed the need for them to be reorganized. To give official sanction to the public debate on the issue, President Barco kicked off the campaign by slapping Lopez on the back when he said that in a democracy it was legitimate to discuss security policy and the effectiveness of the Armed Forces. This was another warning to the two generals that they were on thin ice. Obviously, Gaviria's victory facilitated matters and made their departure a foregone conclusion.

For the time being, given the current state of affairs, it is not likely that the incoming administration will name a civilian as minister of defense, as many had speculated; instead, it will restructure the national security system. The diagnosis is on paper for now; after August, the government's political resolve will be put to the test in the field of action.

## * Trade Strategy With East Europe Outlined

*90SM0173B Bogota LA REPUBLICA in Spanish 26 Jun 90 pp 1-a, 2-a*

[Article by Javier Mozzo Pena]

[Text] Bogota—Training its sights on East Europe, Colombia is launching a very ambitious economic and diplomatic program to conquer the market in that part of the Old World, which is opening up tremendously. It has a sales potential for our country in excess of $500 million a year.

In a race that the administration of President Cesar Gaviria expects to finish in December, the Ministries of Foreign Relations and Economic Development, the National Department of Planning, the Foreign Trade Institute (Incomex), the Export Promotion Fund (Proexpo), Colombian Coal, Inc. (Carbocol), the National Federation of Coffee Growers (Fedecafe), and the Bank of the Republic have begun to draft basic documents on the current situation in those countries and their market potential over the next few years.

### Conquest

Colombia's strategy for undertaking the "conquest of East Europe" will be shaped by the technical-economic studies and by a document presenting our own economy.

The objective is to determine the areas of economic, technical, and scientific cooperation that can be provided there and to show the advantages this country can offer in terms of investment and exports.

At the same time, there will be a broad promotional program that will go hand in hand with the coffee program to demonstrate the wealth our country has to offer in the area of agriculture.

On the diplomatic side, visas will be eliminated to facilitate ongoing contacts between our businessmen and international marketers in those countries.

The government will soon announce the dates and place of a strategy seminar.

In two phases, government officials in charge of economic affairs in that region will be invited to outline the economic and trade policy of Colombia's "opening up" in that area.

In the second phase, the Colombian export sector will be invited along with representatives of the government.

All of them will go together on what will be one of the most important trade missions ever sent from this country. The mission, comprising officials and representatives of the private export sector, will visit each nation in Europe.

At present, a trade mission headed by FEDECAFE trade manager, Juan Camilo Restrepo, and made up of businessmen from various areas of production in the country is traveling throughout East Europe to develop the plan, and will return shortly.

**Today**

So far, trade with those countries consists primarily of coffee sales, and the basket of exports amounts to just over $200 million (1988 figures).

As of 1988 the balance of trade yielded a surplus of $61 million in Colombia's favor, with exports of $201,200,000 and imports of $139,400,000.

The goal is to take advantage of the purchasing power of the inhabitants of these countries (FRG, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, USSR, Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia). Although it is low, it promises to grow larger with the major economic changes that are in store for these countries, such as the elimination of subsidies and of state intervention in the economy.

Colombia will not be the only entrant in this marathon competition, however.

The countries of the European Community and the United States have already set their sights on these nations, and thanks to their industrial and productive potential, they are "feeling out" Eastern European businessmen on the idea of forming mixed enterprises to exploit the "socialist" market.

**Origins**

The Colombian strategy was proposed by Minister of Foreign Relations Julio Londono Paredes on 3 April in Budapest, capital of Hungary.

He held a meeting there with his vice minister, Clemencia Forero, PROEXPO's trade consultant in Vienna, and Colombia's ambassadors to Hungary, FRG, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and the Soviet Union, as well as the charges d'affaires for Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

The Colombian diplomats discussed the political liberalization processes taking place in the countries to which they are accredited.

At the meeting, not made public, the officials analyzed the macroeconomic implications as well as the possibilities for trade, economic and scientific cooperation that Colombia has to offer.

**How Do We See Them?**

In short, according to the minutes of the meeting obtained by Colprensa, the representatives of the Colombian Government concluded that all the countries in that part of the Old World share the following characteristics:

- They have high rates of inflation.
- They are all trying to eliminate subsidies and state intervention in the economy.
- There is a shortage of foreign exchange.
- Their currencies are weak and non-convertible, which will make future commercial transactions difficult.
- The area of intended coverage has been westernized, so the notion of a "socialist bloc" is outmoded.
- The area is undergoing a transition period in order to design marketing strategies.
- There are different levels of debt, ranging from zero (Romania) to $20 billion (Hungary).

**Strategy**

The diplomats feel that a separate market strategy should be devised for each country, based on prior market studies, and that a process of "satchel" selling [ventas de maletin] should begin.

In addition, they would like to promote mixed commissions, formalize cooperation by signing pacts for the protection of investments, avoid double taxation, and achieve the suspension of visas.

It is also necessary to link international banks with the trade process to guarantee the security of payments. Other strategies include the creation of binational chambers of commerce, contacts and promotion among businessmen, and the formation of mixed enterprises.

In terms of the follow-up after the study missions, which will also be made up of officials from the Development Ministry, INCOMEX, and the Bank of the Republic, the government concluded that a document should be drawn up to introduce the "socialist" governments to our economy.

When these adjustments are made in December, the plan will be implemented. It promises to open up a new, unexploited market which can become the most important alternative for Colombia to expand its export basket, currently concentrated on the United States.

East Europe, here we come!

## Peru

### Senate President, Executive Board Sworn In

*PY0108140290 Lima EL COMERCIO in Spanish 27 Jul 90 p A-4*

[Summary] Maximo San Roman, first vice president of the Republic, was elected president of the Senate yesterday. The Senate executive board was also elected yesterday. It is comprised of First Vice President Enrique Bernales Ballesteros, of the Socialist Left; Second Vice President Julian Bustamante Cabello, of Change 90; First Secretary Victor Arroyo Cuyubamba, of Change 90; Second Secretary Luis Vivanco Amorim, of Change 90; and Treasurer Fernando Santolaya Silva, also of Change 90.

### Shining Path, MRTA Control Large Areas

*PY0108185890 Lima EXPRESO in Spanish 26 Jul 90 p 6*

[Excerpt] Santa Lucia, 25 Jul—The Shining Path and the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) have in practice assigned to themselves large jungle areas

where they control towns and villages and even the coca and food production business, and even collect millions from cattle breeders and prosperous businessmen.

Sources linked with the antidrug fight have reported that the MRTA zone begins in the Juanjui area, in Mariscal Caceres province (San Martin) and extends northward to Saposoa, Bellavista, Picota, Tarapoto, Lamas and other towns.

For its part, the Shining Path has absolute control south of Juanjui, in Campanilla, Tocache, Uchiza, Nuevo Progreso, and other Huanuco areas.

The members of these two movements have worked efficiently, because they have managed to impose violence. Frightened townspeople have been compelled to accept their rules of the game. They must report the presence of unknown people or persons who might be policemen or military personnel.

The police do not have enough resources to confront the subversives. They do not have the sophisticated weapons used by the Shining Path and the MRTA, who in their respective zones protect drug traffickers in exchange for large amounts of dollars. The boats the police use to go to different places in the jungle are much slower than the speedboats used by the subversives.

In addition, there is an ever-present problem for the peasants: the low prices paid for the vegetables and cereal that they produce. [passage omitted]

## Guyana

### Prime Minister Praises Relations with Havana

*FL0108113690 Havana Tele Rebelde Network in Spanish 1100 GMT 1 Aug 90*

[Excerpt] Guyanese Prime Minister Hamilton Green has praised Cuba's achievements, adding that he has witnessed the progress our country has made. The chief of the Guyanese Government attended a reception in Georgetown on the occasion of the 37th anniversary of the assault on the Moncada Barracks. Green also said that the level of relations between Cuba and Guyana demonstrates Caribbean unity and cooperation. [passage omitted]